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Abstract 
The Treaty of Lisbon completely changed the substance of Article 6 of the Treaty on the 
European Union.. The rights guaranteed in administrative procedure are protected by three 
sources of fundamental rights which are named in Article 6 TEU. The right to be heard in 
administrative procedure is one of the most important procedural rights, not only on 
national but also on European level. On account of this, the thesis will deal with the right 
to be heard in European administrative procedure as guaranteed in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, in the European Convention on Human Rights and in the general 
principles of the Union’s law where the constitutional traditions of Germany and the 
United Kingdom are at centre of interest. 
Due to the Lisbon Treaty coming into effect, the Charter of fundamental rights became a 
legally binding source of law under Article 6 TEU. To be entitled to a fair and public 
hearing is not only mentioned in Article 41 (2) CFR; the ECJ jurisdiction had already 
clarified before that the right to be heard prior to unfavourable administrative decisions has 
to be guaranteed even without the existence of an express secondary provision.  
First, the thesis analyses how the sources of law of Article 6 TEU work together. In the 
course of this, the existence of a ‘triple’ protection of fundamental rights will be revealed. 
Furthermore, the investigation shows that there still is a need for the ‘general principles’. 
Secondly, the thesis describes the structure of the right to a fair and public hearing of 
Article 41 (2) CFR, the functions of a hearing and particularly who is bound and who is 
legitimated by the provision. 
Thirdly, this thesis shows that Article 6 ECHR is directly applicable in a narrow range of 
administrative proceedings and has indicative effect to the European administrative 
procedure in general. 
At last, the thesis goes into the matter with the right to be heard as a general principle of 
the Union’s law. Hereby the constitutional traditions of Germany and the UK are 
compared. This examination shows how distinct approaches of implementing Union law in 
the different Member States de facto lead to a fragmentation of technically harmonized 
Union law. Even though all Member States guarantee this right in general, the specific 
forms of granting still differ. This thesis points out that this mainly affects functions of 
administrative procedure in general as well as the requirements of the forms of action or 
effects of procedural errors. The thesis closes with a look into the future and poses the 
question whether a uniform codification of European administrative procedure is possible 
and / or desirable.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Purpose and aim of the thesis 
Europeanisation does not only affect the direct implementation of Union law by the 
institutions and bodies of the Union. Furthermore it affects the public law of the Member 
States when they are implementing Union law. Due to the increasing expansion of 
economic integration and the further deepening of European co-operation, the area of 
European administrative law also has become more and more important. Now, Union law 
has to face the challenge of implementing its economic rules and framework in 
administrative proceedings, in administrative proceedings in the Union’s own 
administrative law and in the administrative law of the Member States, which they use to 
implement the Union’s requirements. Even in the area of administrative procedure, the 
impacts of European law on national proceedings occur more and more. However, a 
common integrative ‘European administrative procedure’ like a codification of 
administrative procedure does not exist until today. Reference points for procedural rights 
to be respected and upheld by the institutions and bodies are first of all the innumerous 
regulations of secondary legislation in significant fields of law.1 Moreover, requirements 
for individual procedural rights in administrative procedure are imposed especially by the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States as well as the general principles 
developed by the Union’s courts case law. 
This thesis examines the provisions of the new Article 6 TEU concerning the guarantee of 
one of the most important procedural rights: The right of the individual to be heard in 
European administrative procedure. The right to be heard, respectively the right to a fair 
and public hearing constitutes one of the most important parts of the rule of law2 and of the 
fundamental rights, not only in administrative court proceedings, but also in administrative 
procedure.3  
                                                 
1 See for example Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ [2003] L 1/1; Council Regulation 
(EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger 
Regulation), OJ [2004] L 24/1; Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection 
against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community, OJ [2009] L 343/51. 
2 See Case 294/83 Les Verts [1986] 1339, para 23. In the United Kingdom, this principle occurs in the form 
of ‘natural justice’, see below. 
3 See the jurisdiction of the German ‚Bundesverfassungsgericht’ regarding the administrative court 
proceedings BVerfGE 9, 89 (95) and BVerfGE 34, 1 (7) and the ‘Rechtsstaatsprinzip’, see P. Kunig, Das 
Rechtsstaatsprinzip, p. 217 et seq. with additional references. 
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Even on the European level, the general rule that a person whose interests are perceptibly 
affected by a decision taken by a public authority must be given the opportunity to make 
his point of view known, became accepted at an early stage.4  
The ECJ as well has recognized the right to be heard in administrative procedure and stated 
in the Lisrestal case that 
‘Observance of the right to be heard is, in all proceedings initiated against a 
person which are liable to culminate in a measure adversely affecting that person, 
a fundamental principle of Community law which must be guaranteed even in the 
absence of any rules governing the proceedings in question.’5 
By including the right to good administration in the Charter of Fundamental Rights in 
2002, this right became part of an international declaration of human rights for the first 
time. 
Even though the Charter of Fundamental Rights did not become legally binding until 
coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, its inherent right to be heard was part of 
the general principles of Union law even before.  
The new Treaty of Lisbon completely changed the substance of Article 6 of the Treaty on 
the European Union. Article 6 TEU describes the sources from which the fundamental 
rights of the Union can be derived. The new Article 6 TEU does not only state that the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights shall have the same legal value as the Treaties, but also 
states that the Union shall accede to the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
general principles of Union law are also still mentioned in Article 6 TEU. The aim of the 
thesis is to not only to look at the substance of the guarantee, but also it is to examine how 
the new sources work together and what this means for the European administrative 
procedure, especially with regards to the right to be heard. Additionally, the question of 
establishing a consistent right to be heard from the different sources will be analysed. 
 
1.2. Structure of the thesis 
It is the objective of this thesis to point out which standards and demands the sources of 
Article 6 TEU provide for the right to a fair and public hearing in European administrative 
procedure as well as to outline similarities and differences of the different sources 
regarding the right to be heard.  
Subject of this thesis is the examination of the guarantee of the right to be heard in 
European administrative procedure as well as the opportunity to derive a consistent right to 
                                                 
4 Case 17/74 Transocean Marine Paint [1974] 1063, para 15. 
5 Case C-32/95 P Lisrestal [1996] ECR I-5373, para 21. 
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be heard from the different sources of law. Reference points are the different sources of 
law provided by Article 6 TEU.  
First, the research intends to analyse how the sources of law of Article 6 TEU work 
together. In the course of this, the possible existence of a double or triple protection of 
fundamental rights will be examined. Furthermore, the investigation will try to determine if 
– besides the (future) binding force of the Charter and the Convention – there still is a need 
for the ‘general principles’, and how the mentioned sources rank amongst themselves. 
Secondly, it is proposed to describe the structure of the right to a fair and public hearing of 
Article 41 (2) CFR. For this purpose, a discussion will show how the Charter came into 
effect and how the Courts of the Union referred to Article 41 (2) even before it became 
binding. In addition, the functions of a hearing will be described, particularly who is bound 
and who is legitimated by the provision. 
Thirdly, the research will deal with the question whether Article 6 ECHR is applicable to 
the administration and the administration procedure and if so to what extent. It will be 
outlined how the right to a fair hearing is guaranteed and how the article might be only 
applicable in a narrow range of administration procedures. 
At last, the thesis will go into matter with the right to be heard as a general principle of 
Union law as it results from the constitutional traditions of the Member States. Hereby, the 
constitutional traditions of Germany and the United Kingdom will be analysed and 
compared. Finally, soft law provisions will also be dealt with. 
Due to Article 6 TEU as initial point, the proposed research does not have the objective to 
describe the right to be heard in secondary legislation or to analyse the ECJ’s jurisdiction 
concerning these provisions in detail. 
 
2. The sources of Article 6 TEU – double or triple protection of 
fundamental rights 
2.1. Fundamental and procedural rights as general principles of 
European Union law 
Apart from its codification in the Charta of Fundamental Rights, the right to be heard 
belongs to the general principles of Union law. According to Article 6 (3) TEU the 
fundamental rights arise from the general principles of Union law in the way they are 
guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States. 
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Therefore, the fundamental rights as they have been developed by the ECJ from the 
general principles constitute an integral part of Union law. 
Under the principle of conferral of Article 5 (2) TEU, the Union shall act only within the 
limits of its competences. Hence, the ECJ requires competences conferred upon this 
principle in the Treaties for the development of fundamental rights. This necessary 
competence can be derived from Article 19 TEU. Furthermore, the effet utile principle as 
well as the principles of equivalence and effectiveness contribute to the evolution of 
general principles by the ECJ. Apart from the ‘original’ fundamental Union rights, the 
procedural rights of administrative procedure also belong to the general principles 
developed by the ECJ.  
The first point of reference in administrative procedure for case law developments based 
upon Article 19 TEU was the Algera case, where the ECJ resolved to develop the 
administrative law of the Community, taking into account the rules recognised in the 
legislation, academic writing and case law of the Member States.6 Hence, Article 220 EC, 
now Article 19 TEU, played a key role for the Community’s qualification as ‘Community 
of Law’. Parallel to this qualification, the ECJ developed the rule of law principle7 which is 
common to the constitutional principles of the Member States8 and codified in the 
preamble and Article 2 TEU. Consequently, the competence of the ECJ to develop general 
principles of Union law results from the duty stated in Article 19 (1) TEU namely to ensure 
that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed. 
General principles are fundamental legal principles of Union law in the way they have 
been developed by the evolution of the Treaties and are specific for Union law. Another 
component of the general principles are fundamental rights as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States and as guaranteed by the ECHR 
and elaborated by means of a comparative analysis of legal systems of the Member States.9 
In its jurisprudence, the ECJ expressively acknowledged that fundamental rights belong to 
the general principles of Union law.10 Administrative procedural rights also constitute 
general principles in the sense of Article 6 (3) TEU, in particular the right to be heard as 
part of the administrative principle of a fair administrative procedure. As a general 
European administrative procedure has not been codified, neither in the field of direct nor 
indirect implementation of Union law, the general principles developed by the ECJ are of 
                                                 
6 Joined Cases 7/56 and 3-7/57 Algera [1957] 83, 118; see Lord Millett, ‘The Right to Good Administration 
in European Law’ (2002) Public law 309 at p. 313.  
7 Case 294/83 Les Verts [1986] 1339, para 23. 
8 R. Arnold, ‘A Fundamental Rights Charter for the European Union’ (2000-2001) 15 Tulane European and 
Civil Law Forum 43, at p. 51. 
9 K. Kańska, ‘Towards Administrative Human Rights in the EU’ ELJ 10 (2004) 296, at p. 302. 
10 First in Case 29/69 Stauder [1969] 419, para 7. 
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special importance in the field of administrative procedure. Also the right to be heard as 
general principle of administrative procedure arises from the Courts´ jurisdiction. Even 
long before the codification in Article 41 (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the 
right to be heard was part of the general principle of good or sound administration. 
A further source of interpretation of rights for the general principle of the right to be heard 
are according to Article 6 (3) TEU the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as well as the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States. In addition, specific rights to be heard can be derived from other 
international human rights agreements as well as soft law provisions. 
 
2.2. The Union’s accession to the European Convention on 
Human Rights 
According to Article 6 (3) TEU fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, shall 
constitute general principles of the Union’s law. Due to the coming into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, the newly inserted Article 6 (2) TEU comes into focus. It provides that ‘the Union 
shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms.’ The wording suggests that the TEU does not only empower the 
Union to accede to the ECHR, it also obliges it to take the necessary measures. An 
empowerment as currently stipulated in Article 6 (2) TEU became necessary due to 
Opinion 2/94 of the ECJ on Accession the ECHR. The ECJ stated that the accession of the 
Union to the ECHR had to face two main problems: Firstly, the competence of the 
Community to conclude such an agreement and secondly, its compatibility with the 
provisions of the Treaty, in particular those relating to the jurisdiction of the Court. 
Furthermore, the ECJ concluded that such a modification of the system for the protection 
of human rights in the Community would be of constitutional significance and therefore 
would go beyond the scope of ex-Art. 308 EC, now Art. 352 TFEU. It could be brought 
about only by way of Treaty amendment.11 However, Article 6 (2) TEU now emphasises 
that ‘Such accession shall not affect the Union’s competences as defined in the Treaties’ 
and the accession to the ECHR demanded modifications of the ECHR. According to 
Protocol No. 14 to the European Convention on Human Rights, the possibility was given 
that Article 59 ECHR could be amended in lights of the possible accession by the Union. 
The new second paragraph ‘The European Union may accede to this Convention’ makes 
                                                 
11 Opinion 2/94 on Accession to the ECHR [1996] ECR I-1759, paras 9, 35; see S. Weatherill, EU Law, 8th 
edn. (Oxford, 2007), 64. 
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provision for this possibility.12 Due to Article 19 of the Protocol, it entered into force after 
ratification of all Member States on 01 June 2010. Even after entering into force of the 
protocol, further modifications to the Convention will be necessary. Those could be 
brought about either through an amending protocol to the Convention or by means of an 
accession treaty to be concluded between the European Union, on the one hand, and the 
State Parties to the Convention, on the other.13 
What is more, obstacles have to be overcome even from the Union’s point of view. On the 
one hand the Member States have imposed several conditions in Protocol No. 814 to be 
respected when proceeding with the accession. This Protocol requires that the specific 
characteristics of the Union must be preserved and the competences of the Union and the 
powers of its institutions must not be affected. On the other hand, the Treaty of Lisbon 
stipulates further procedural barriers for the accession in Article 218 (6) a) ii) TFEU. This 
provision states that the conclusion of the agreement will require the consent of the 
European Parliament. Article 218 (8) TFEU provides that such accession will require 
unanimity in the Council as well as approval by the Member States.15 
Due to these high requirements, the question arises when the accession of the Union to the 
Convention will finally take place. Furthermore, it can be assumed that concessions have 
to be made to certain Member States, comparable to the debate regarding the legal binding 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. However, the ECHR is going to become a direct 
source of law as part of the general principles, besides the function of source of 
interpretation of rights, which is its actual legal status. For this thesis it is presumed that the 
accession will take place. Therefore the question arises how the different sources of law of 
Article 6 TEU rang amongst themselves.  
 
2.3. Relationship between the Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
the general principles in the protection of human rights 
Thus, according to Article 6 (2) and (3) TEU, the right results from three already named 
sources of rights: The Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the general principles. 
                                                 
12 E. Myjer, ‘Can the EU join the ECHR – General Conditions and Practical Arrangements’ in I. Pernice et 
al. (eds.), The future of the European judicial system in a comparative perspective (Baden-Baden, 2006), 297 
at p. 298.  
13 Study of the technical and legal issues of a possible EC/EU accession to the European Convention of 
Human Rights, Report adopted by the Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH) at its 53rd meeting 
(25-28 June 2002), DG-II(2002)006.  
14 Protocol No. 8 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
15 J.-C. Piris, The Lisbon Treaty (Cambridge, 2010), 163 et seq. 
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Firstly, the question of the relationship between the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the 
general principles of Article 6 TEU should be examined. The relation between those two 
sources could become a challenging task, if the scope of protection of the general 
principles exceed those of the Charter. Thus, Article 6 TEU or the Convents documents 
should be analysed with reference to the matter if they provide a hierarchy of sources of 
fundamental rights. 
At the outset, it has to be stated that with regard to substance, the guarantees of the Charter 
largely match the ones of the general principles. 
It might be assumed that the parallel existence of paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article 6 TEU 
already demonstrates the equal status of both sources and thus no specific order of 
precedence of the sources can be extracted from Article 6 TEU.16 In this case, both 
guarantees would be applicable cumulatively and the entitled person could refer to the 
guarantee which offers a wider scope of protection. 
Attention should be paid to the fact that the Charter of Fundamental Rights shall have the 
same legal value as the Treaties according to Art. 6 (1) TEU; thus, these components 
constitute equal cornerstones of the Union’s primary law. In the case that the general 
principles would be ranked equally to the rights derived from the Charter, an unwritten 
source of law would be ranked equally to the Treaties. This conclusion however cannot be 
drawn from Article 6 TEU. 
Another option would be to refer to the history and evolution of the general principles. 
Comparable to ex-Article 6 TEU, they could be allowed to enjoy primacy over the Charter 
whereas the latter could be referred to a supporting position for interpretation of the scope 
of protection. 
This approach interferes with the wording of Article 6 TEU. The wording of the new 
Article 6 TEU which emphasises the legal binding and equality of the Charter to the 
Treaties as well as the European legislator’s will would be undermined. This is due to the 
fact that otherwise the revision of Article 6 TEU after the Treaty of Lisbon would be 
dispensable and not even only declaratory.17 
Another possibility for the ECJ would be to manage two separate but parallel fundamental 
rights regimes: The Charter applying to the institutions of the Union and Member States 
implementing Union law and the general principles applying in all other situations, such as 
Member State derogations from the Treaties.18  
                                                 
16 W. Weiß, ‘Grundrechtsquellen im Verfassungsvertrag’ (2005), ZEuS, 323 at p. 325.  
17 Similarly E. Schulte-Herbrüggen, ‘Der Grundrechtsschutz in der Europäischen Union nach dem Vertrag 
von Lissabon’ ZEuS (2009), 343 at p. 353. 
18 M. Dougan, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: Winning minds, not hearts’ CMLR 45 (2008), 617 at p. 664. 
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This approach would undermine the required unity and transparency as well as the clarity 
of the protection of fundamental rights. 
Article 6 TEU expressly issues a clear statement: The three sources of fundamental rights 
shall guarantee the protection of these rights. Due to the explicit wording and the 
systematic position in Article 6 (1) TEU, the Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights rank equally on the top of the fundamental rights’ hierarchy. This leads to the 
conclusion that the Charter takes precedence and ranks at the top of the fundamental rights 
hierarchy pyramid. This conclusion is as well in accordance with the rule of law which 
stipulates the primacy of written law. The provisions of the Charter thus function as leges 
speciales to the general principles of Article 6 (3) TEU.19 
The general necessity of the general principles as source of the Union’s fundamental rights 
still remains even after coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty. They keep their status as 
fundamental rights with ‘constitutional status’, but rank below the Charter. They mainly 
have a -highly important- complementary function. 
Due to the fact that, with regards to substance, the guarantees of the Charter largely match 
the ones of the general principles, the general principles serve to acknowledge additional 
fundamental rights, which occur by the evolution of the traditions common to the Member 
States. 
This is in line with classic constitutional doctrine which never interprets the catalogues of 
fundamental rights in constitutions as being exhaustive, thus permitting the development of 
additional rights through case-law as society changes.20 
For reasons of transparency and legal certainty of the European protection of fundamental 
rights, it is necessary that the clear-cut guarantees of the Charter which are well refined and 
differentiated by the jurisdiction of the ECJ will not be undermined by also taking into 
account the general principles. 
In summary, the fundamental rights are guaranteed in a three-tier hierarchy under the 
Treaty of Lisbon. First and foremost, the guarantees as provided by the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, having the same legal value as the Treaties themselves, rank at the 
top of the fundamental rights hierarchy pyramid.  
In case of the Union’s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, it would 
become a directly enforceable source of rights as an international treaty following the 
                                                 
19 C. Grabenwarter, ‘Auf dem Weg in die Grundrechtsgemeinschaft?’ EuGRZ (2004), 563 at p. 569. 
20 The European Convention, CONV 528/03, p. 14. 
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procedure of Article 218 TFEU, but it would be subordinated to the Treaties and hence the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights with the addition to be prior to secondary legislation.21 
The fundamental rights of the general principles, and with them the ECHR and the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States still serve as a source of inspiration 
and interpretation of rights and hence as an omnibus clause; as far as the Charter codifies 
identical rights, the ones codified in the Charter are prior and more particular compared to 
the general principles.  
 
2.4. The guarantees of Article 6 TEU – double or triple protection 
of fundamental rights?  
The coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon along with the revision of Article 6 TEU led 
to a far-reaching change in the system of protection of fundamental rights on European 
level. Consequently, the new relationship and hierarchy of the different sources of law had 
to be determined. Through the chance, sources of interpretation became directly binding 
sources of law, leading to an alteration of the system of protection of fundamental rights 
within a multi-level system. Hence, this raises the question, of how many levels and 
sources the Union’s system of protection of fundamental rights is composed. 
Firstly, the wording of Article 6 TEU has to be investigated. In its three paragraphs, 
Article 6 TEU provides three different sources of European fundamental rights.  
Article 6 (1) TEU acknowledges the binding legal force of the Charter. Additionally, it is 
granted the same legal value as the Treaties. Its second paragraph stipulates that the Union 
shall accede to the Convention on Human Rights whereas the third paragraph still 
guarantees the fundamental rights as provided by the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States.  
By virtue of its wording, Article 6 TEU provides a threefold system of protection of 
fundamental rights on Union level.  
As soon as the Union will accede to the Convention on Human Rights, it will become a 
directly applicable source of law. Simultaneously, it will remain a source for the 
interpretation of fundamental rights for the general principles in the context of Article 6 (3) 
TEU. Additionally, by the virtue of Article 52 (3) CFR, the general principles will continue 
to incidental influence on the significance as well as the scope of the fundamental rights as 
acknowledged in the ECHR and CFR.  
                                                 
21 E. Pache & F. Rösch, ‘Die neue Grundrechtsordnung der EU nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon’ EuR (2009), 
769 at p. 785. 
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Because of its new legal binding force the Charter now constitutes a part of primary law. 
Due to its equality concerning the ‘same legal value’, it represents the third corner pillar of 
the Union’s primary law besides the TEU and the TFEU. Insofar, this results in a ‘double’ 
protection of fundamental rights on Union level. 
It can be deduced from Article 6 (3) TEU, which correlates to ex-Article 6 (2) TEU that the 
unwritten fundamental rights remain part of the primary law as general principles. The 
protection of fundamental rights is even strengthened by the continuity of the general 
principles in the way it is stipulated in Article 6 TEU in addition to the legal binding of the 
Charter. 
What is more, Article 6 (3) TEU makes it clear that the incorporation of the Charter does 
not prevent the ECJ from drawing on the general principles in form of the two sources 
ECHR and common constitutional traditions to recognise additional fundamental rights 
which might emerge from any future developments in those two sources.22 
In addition, the Charter as a written catalogue of fundamental rights is limited to the extent 
it had on the day of its proclamation. On that account, it naturally could not foresee future 
developments. The evolution of rights is a dynamic process particularly in communities 
across state-borders whereas a continuous modification of the written Charter in fact is not 
realisable. 
The general principles are therefore still necessary to adapt the level of protection of 
fundamental rights to the particular requirements of the Union and its Member States. The 
application of the general principles as a third corner pillar of the protection of 
fundamental rights is therefore inevitable.  
In conclusion, it can be assumed that Article 6 TEU recognises three different sources of 
rights by keeping the general principles as an important source of law. The protection of 
fundamental rights on the European level hence is guaranteed by a multi-level system of 
fundamental rights, namely a triple protection consisting of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, the Convention on Human Rights and the general principles. 
 
                                                 
22 The European Convention, CONV 528/03, p. 13. 
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3. The right to a fair and public hearing in Article 41 (2) CFR 
3.1. The legal binding force of Article 41 CFR in its historic 
development 
3.1.1. The history of the Charter – from the preliminary 
works to the Lisbon Treaty 
Even long before the decision was made to establish a European Charter of Fundamental 
Rights the significance of protection of fundamental rights became acknowledged on 
European level. Whereas the founding Treaties originally were established as traditional 
international treaties intending to create an Economic Community due to which an 
infringement of individual fundamental rights could not be foreseen, a discussion with 
questions of protection of fundamental rights became inevitable by establishing the direct 
applicability23 and supremacy24 of Community law at the latest.  
In the Stauder case of 1969 the ECJ expressly derived fundamental rights from the general 
principles of Community law for the first time.25 In the subsequent decisions the 
commitment to the protection of fundamental rights became even more serious. The ECJ 
concretised its point of view in a way that the Court shall be bound to draw inspiration 
from constitutional traditions common to the Member States to safeguard the fundamental 
rights.26 In the following years several attempts were made to consolidate the fundamental 
rights created as part of the legal order and to codify them in a modern catalogue of 
European fundamental rights.27  
At the European Council Cologne meeting in June 1999 the Council finally decided on the 
drawing up on a Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.28 The Presidents 
of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission signed the Charter and it was 
solemnly proclaimed at the European Council Meeting in Nice on 07 December 2000.29 
However, the Charter explicitly did not become legally binding by its proclamation. 
After the Treaty of Nice came into force in February 2003, the heads of state and heads of 
government of the Member States called for proceeding reforms.  
                                                 
23 Case 26/62 Van Gend & Loos [1963] 3. 
24 Case 6/64 Costa/ENEL [1964] 1251; now „direct applicability and supremacy of Union law”. 
25 Case 29/69 Stauder [1969] 419, para 7; now „general principles of Union law.  
26 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] 1125, para 4; Case 4/73 Nold [1974] 491, para 13. 
27 For example the ‘Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms’, OJ [1989] C 120/51 and the 
‘Resolution of the Constitution on of the European Union’, OJ [1994] C 61/155. 
28 Conclusions of the Presidency, European Council Meeting Cologne, 3-4 June 1999, Annex IV. 
29 Concerning the drafting of the Charter see G. de Burca, ‘The drafting of the European Union Charter of 
fundamental rights’ (2001) 26 EL Rev 126. 
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Therefore, the main purposes of the European Council Meeting in Laeken in December 
2001 were simplifying the Treaties, setting out the powers of the Union and the Member 
States as well as considering the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.30 In these 
matters, the Council decided to establish a ‘Convention on the Future of Europe’ under the 
leadership of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, a former French president, who finished its work 
with the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, in which the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights should be incorporated into Part II and be given legal force.31  
The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe32 was finally signed in Rome on 
29 October 2004 and was supposed to come into force in November 2006. However, by 
01 January 2007, eighteen Member States had ratified the Treaty, seven had suspended 
their ratification process and France and the Netherlands had rejected the Treaty by 
referendum.33 Finally, the Treaty failed due to serious reservations concerning fundamental 
problems of legitimacy as well as objections against the Constitution which did not only 
address its innovative parts, but also principles and rules regarding the common market.34 
What is more, the incorporation of the Charter into Part II of the Constitution met further 
concerns.  
After a pause for reflection imposed by the European Council, the German presidency 
decided to convoke a new intergovernmental conference, which was instructed to elaborate 
a new draft Treaty before the end of 2007 on the basis of a detailed mandate adopted by the 
European Council.35 The new Treaty was signed at Lisbon on 13 December 2007 and came 
into force on 01 December 2009. 
The direct incorporation of the Charter into the Treaty became abandoned due to the 
United Kingdom’s, Poland’s and Czech Republic’s objection. 
However, the Charter’s exclusion from the Treaty does not change its primary law status. 
The legal binding force of the Charter in the way it was intended by the Constitutional 
Treaty is created by the ‘detour’ via Article 6 (1) TEU, except for the United Kingdom, 
Poland and the Czech Republic, which succeeded to be granted a special protocol.36 
According to Article 6 (1) TEU, the Charter shall have the same legal value as the Treaties, 
                                                 
30 A. Reid, European Union, 4th edn. (Edinburgh, 2010), 8. 
31 C. W. Timmermanns, ‘The Genesis and Development of the European Communities and the European 
Union’ in P. J. G. Kapteyn et al. (eds.), The Law of the European Union and the European Communities 4th 
edn. (Alphen aan den Rijnn, 2008), 1 at p. 40 et seq. 
32 Treaty establishing a Constituion for Europe, OJ [2004] C 301/1. 
33 J.-C. Piris, The Lisbon Treaty (Cambridge, 2010), 25. 
34 C. W. Timmermanns, ‘The Genesis and Development of the European Communities and the European 
Union’ in P. J. G. Kapteyn et al. (eds.), The Law of the European Union and the European Communities 4th 
edn. (Alphen aan den Rijnn, 2008), 1 at p. 42. 
35 C. W. Timmermanns, ‘The Genesis and Development of the European Communities and the European 
Union’ in P. J. G. Kapteyn et al. (eds.), The Law of the European Union and the European Communities 4th 
edn. (Alphen aan den Rijnn, 2008), 1 at p. 42. 
36 See below, Protocol on the application of the Charter to Poland and the United Kingdom. 
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whereas their provisions shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union as 
defined in the Treaties. Due to the Union’s obligation to accede the ECHR codified in 
Article 6 (2) TEU, Article 6 TEU thus arises to become an ‘Article of recognition of 
human rights’.  
 
3.1.2. The Protocol on the application of the Charter to 
Poland and the United Kingdom 
According to Article 6 (1) TEU the Charter shall have the same legal value as the Treaties, 
whereas their provisions shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union as 
defined in the Treaties. In the negotiations before signing the Lisbon Treaty, the United 
Kingdom and Poland succeeded to be granted the Protocol on the application of the 
Charter to Poland and the United Kingdom.37 This protocol has later been amended to the 
Czech Republic. It has often been viewed as being an ‘opt-out’, and that its aim and result 
would be that the Charter would not be binding for the United Kingdom and Poland.38  
It might be argued that the question of the legal binding status is factually obsolete whether 
the fundamental right concerned as well constitutes a general principle, which is the case 
with regards to the right to be heard. This will be examined by the thesis. However, the 
fundamental rights which constitute general principles of Union law are binding for Poland 
and the United Kingdom anyhow.  
However, this question is debatable. Firstly, it is necessary to have a look at the wording. 
Article 1 (1) of the Protocol states that the Charter does not extend the ability of the ECJ or 
any court or tribunal of Poland or the United Kingdom to declare that the laws, regulations 
or administrative provisions, practices or actions of Poland or of the United Kingdom are 
inconsistent with the Charter. According to Article 1 (2) of the Protocol, Title IV of the 
Charter does not create justiciable rights applicable to Poland or the United Kingdom 
except in so far as Poland or the United Kingdom have provided for such rights in their 
national laws. Article 2 ensures that a provision of the Charter which refers to national 
laws and practices does only apply to Poland or to the United Kingdom to the extent that 
the rights or principles that it contains are recognised in their law or practices.  
None of the provisions of this protocol clearly state that the Charter should not be legally 
binding to Poland or the United Kingdom. Article 1 (1) basically ensures that the Charter 
does not create new rights. This fact, however, is not a new one, but already stated in 
                                                 
37 Protocol on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and to 
the United Kingdom, OF [2007] C 306/156. 
38 J.-C. Piris, The Lisbon Treaty (Cambridge, 2010), 160. 
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Article 51 CFR.39 Notably, the European Union Committee of the House of Lords clearly 
said ‘The Protocol is not an opt-out from the Charter. The Charter will apply in the United 
Kingdom even if its interpretation may be affected by the terms of the Protocol.’40 
Except from Article 2, which could be possible evidence of an opt-out from the rights of 
Title IV,41 the Charter will evidently continue to apply to Poland and the United Kingdom. 
Therefore, they will have to respect the rights of the Charter under Article 6 (1) TEU when 
they are implementing Union law. Due to this, the Charter of Fundamental Rights constitutes a 
source of law under Article 6 TEU for all Member States even for The United Kingdom, 
Poland and the Czech Republic. 
 
3.1.3. Legal status and force of the Charter 
As mentioned above, the Charter did not become a direct legally binding source of law not 
until coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Until this point, the Charter had the status of 
a non-binding declaration notwithstanding serving as a decisive source of inspiration for 
the general principles. To analyse the structure and substance of the Charter, the right to 
good administration and its inherent right to be heard, it is indispensable to examine the 
development of its legal binding force, its acknowledgement in the Court’s case law and 
the commitment of the European Union institutions. The treatment of the Charter and in 
particular of its provided rights in the past has decisive impact on today’s legal status. This 
especially applies to the substance and scope of protection of those rights, which have not 
been established in primary legislation before coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty. They 
have been developed by the Courts’ case law for which the Charter served as source of 
inspiration of rights. In spite of the lack of binding force, the point of view of the European 
Union institutions became clear by the solemnly proclamation of the European Parliament, 
the Council and the Commission in Nice on 07 December 2000. Furthermore, it became 
fixed in the public’s consciousness. Additionally, the Charter de facto took on great 
importance as a source of interpretation of rights. This became clear by the commitment of 
the European Union institutions as well as the frequent references to the Charter in the 
jurisdiction of the courts and the opinions of many Advocates General. 
 
                                                 
39 J.-C. Piris, The Lisbon Treaty (Cambridge, 2010), 161 et seq. 
40 Report by the House of Lords, European Union Committee, 10th Report of Session 2007-2008, The Treaty 
of Lisbon: An Impact Assessment, 13 March 2008, HL Paper 62, para 5.87. 
41See the analysis of C. Barnard, ‘The ‘Opt-Out’ for the UK and Poland from the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights: Triumph of Rhetoric over Reality?’ in S. Griller & J. Ziller (eds.) The Lisbon Treaty (Heidelberg, 
2008), 257 at p. 268 et seqq. 
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3.1.4. References to the Charter in the jurisdiction of the 
courts of the European Union 
A self-commitment of the Courts to the Charter was not given and de facto not possible 
before it became legally binding by virtue of the Lisbon Treaty. However, the jurisdiction 
of the Courts showed a tendency towards referring to the Charter, even though they did not 
acknowledge it as the decisive legally binding source of law.  
The Charter was mentioned by the General Court for the first time in the 
Mannesmannröhren-Werke48 case. The General Court pointed out that the Charter could be 
of no consequence for the purpose of review of the contested measure, because it was 
adopted prior to that date.49 
Soon afterwards the General Court referred for the first time expressly to the Charter and 
the right to good administration of Article 41 CFR. It stated that the Charter provides 
additional evidence of the status and relevance of the right of good administration.50 The 
contested measure in the max.mobil51 case also took place prior to the date of the Charter’s 
proclamation, but the General Court referred to the Charter and the right to good 
administration only in the course of the examination of admissibility. In this case, the 
General Court uses the set phrase of the Charter’s confirmation of the general principles 
that are common to the constitutional traditions of the Member States.52 Special attention is 
should be paid to the Order of the President of the General Court in the Technische 
Glaswerke Ilmenau53 case where the right to good administration is described to be the 
result of the rule of law. It also makes reference to the max.mobil case and Article 41 
CFR.54  
In the Alrosa55 case, the General Court expressly referred to the right to be heard pursuant 
to the first indent of Article 41 (2) CFR for the first time in recent jurisdiction. The 
applicant based her right to be heard on the European regulation on the implementation of 
the rules on competition.57 According to recital No. 37 of the regulation it respects the 
fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter. 
                                                 
48 Case T-112/98 Mannesmannröhren-Werke [2001] ECR II-729. 
49 Case T-112/98 Mannesmannröhren-Werke [2001] ECR II-729, para 76. 
50 J. Menéndez, ‘Chartering Europe: Legal Status and Policy Implications of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union’ (2002) 40 JCMS 471, at p. 474. 
51 Case T-54/99 max.mobil [2002] ECR II-313. 
52 Case T-54/99 max.mobil [2002] ECR II-313, para 48; concerning the significance of this case in the 
context of good administration, see K. Kańska, ‘Towards Administrative Human Rights in the EU’ ELJ 10 
(2004) 296, at p. 305; L. Azoulai, ‘Le principe de bonne administration’ in J.-B. Auby & J. Dutheil de la 
Rochère (eds.), Droit administrative européen (Bruxelles, 2007), 493 at p. 505 et seq. 
53 Case T-198/01 R Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau [2002] ECR II-2152. 
54 Case T-198/01 R Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau [2002] ECR II-2152, para 85. 
55 Case T-170/06 Alrosa [2007] ECR II-2601. 
57 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ [2003] L 1/1. 
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Accordingly, this regulation should be interpreted and applied with respect to those rights 
and principles. Thus, the regulation directly submits to the Charter in its recitals which 
leads to a case of de facto self-commitment.58 
Also in the following judgements, the General Court repeatedly referred to the Charter and 
in particular to the right to good administration pursuant to Article 41 CFR, for example in 
the JCB Services,59 Sunrider60 and Compagnie maritime belge SA61 cases. 
The case law makes clear that the Charter became more and more referred to, to confirm or 
underline the rights derived from the general principles.  
 
The Advocates General of the Court of Justice have established a practice of invoking the 
Charter as legal authority. Most of the references attribute a rather limited value to the 
Charter.62 Advocate General Alber stated less than two month after proclamation of the 
Charter that the Charter underlined the importance of a fundamental value judgment of 
Community law.63 In the following decisions the Charter was referred to confirm the 
particular Advocate’s general point of view. 64 The Advocate General Tizzano went so far  
to refer to the Charter as a stand-alone source of law for legal testing of human rights even 
without legal force of the Charter.65 
Worth mentioning are the recent references to the Charter which deal with the right to 
good administration pursuant to Article 41 (1) CFR. In the Koldo Gorostiaga 
Atxalandabaso66 case, the appellant alleged breach of the Code of Good Administrative 
Behaviour as well as Article 41 CFR. However, the Code constitutes a resolution of the 
European Parliament to put forward a legislative proposal and not a binding legal 
                                                 
58 Case T-170/06 Alrosa [2007] ECR II-2601, para 203. 
59 Case T-67/01 JCB Servies [2004] ECR II-49, para 36. 
60 Case T-242/02 Sunrider [2005] ECR II-2793, para 51. 
61 Case T-276/04 Compagnie maritime belge SA [2008] ECR II-1277, para 39. 
62 See for example the first and most recent references to the Charter, Opinion of Advocate General Alber, 
Case C-340/99 TNT Traco SPA [2001] ECR I-4109, para 94; Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, Case C-
173/99 BECTU [2001] ECR I-4881, para 26 et seqq.; Opinion of Advocate General Mischo, Case C-192/99 P 
D and Sweden v. Council [2001] ECR I-4319, para 97; Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Case C-97/08 P 
Akzo Nobel NV [2009] ECR I-8237, para 63; Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Case C-441/07 P Alrosa 
[2010] ECR I-5949, para 167 concerning the right to be heard pursuant to Article 41 CFR. 
63 Opinion of Advocate General Alber, Case C-340/99 TNT Traco SPA [2001] ECR I-4109, para 94. 
64 Opinion of Advocate General Mischo, Case C-192/99 P D and Sweden v. Council [2001] ECR I-4319, 
para 97; Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores [2002] I-
6677, para 39; concerning the scope of application see J. de la Rochère, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, Not Binding but Influential: the Example of Good Administration’ in A. Arnull et al. (eds.), 
Continuity and Change in EU Law (Oxford, 2008), 157 at p. 164 et seq. 
65 Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, Case C-173/99 BECTU [2001] ECR I-4881, para 26 et seqq.; 
J. Menéndez, ‘Chartering Europe: Legal Status and Policy Implications of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union’ (2002) 40 JCMS 471, at p. 474. 
66 Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak, Case C-308/07 P, Koldo Gorostiaga Atxalandabaso [2009] ECR 
I-1059, para 73 et seq. 
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provision.67 Therefore, the appellant’s rights have not been infringed, so that Advocate 
General Trstenjak did not consider Article 41 CFR as infringed.68  
 
Contrary to the General Court’s and the Advocates’ General opinions, the European Court 
of Justice did not mention the Charter for a very long time. Regardless whether the 
applicants asserted rights from the Charter or the Advocates General referred to it, the ECJ 
ignored those attempts, probably to not be forced to take an unequivocal stand.69 For the 
first time, the Charter has been explicitly referred to in an ECJ-case by its President in the 
Order Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau.70 The ECJ’s Order used a similar formula to the one 
of the General Court stating that Article 41 CFR confirms the right to sound 
administration, which is one of the general principles that are observed in a state governed 
by the rule of law and are common to the constitutional traditions of the Member States. 
Explicit reference in an ECJ’s judgement was not made before 2006 when the ECJ 
dismissed a case filed by the European Parliament against the Council directive 
2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification.71 Even though the ECJ pointed out that the 
Charter constitutes a non-legally binding document, it emphasised its significance by 
mentioning it in the recitals.72 
In the following cases the ECJ took the same path as the General Court and proved that the 
particular fundamental right is a general principle of Community law stemming from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, which has been enshrined in the 
ECHR and which has also been reaffirmed by the Charter.73 Since then, the ECJ regularly 
makes references to the Charter.74  
After the failure of the Constitutional Treaty, the Charter is now legally binding by link in 
Article 6 (1) TEU. Due to this fact, it can be assumed that the ECJ is now going to refer to 
                                                 
67 See below section 3.2.6. ‘The Code of Good Administrative Behaviour’. 
68 Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak, Case C-308/07 P, Koldo Gorostiaga Atxalandabaso [2009] ECR 
I-1059, para 73 et seq. 
69 As well J. de la Rochère, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Not Binding but Influential: the 
Example of Good Administration’ in A. Arnull et al. (eds.), Continuity and Change in EU Law (Oxford, 
2008), 157 at p. 165. 
70 Case C-232/02 P (R) Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau [2002] ECR I-8977, paras 85 and 115. 
71
 Council directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, OJ [2003] 
L 251/12. 
72 Case C-540/03 European Parliament v Council [2006] I-5769, para 38; a direct recourse to the Charter 
remained avoided, see J. de la Rochère, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Not Binding but Influential: 
the Example of Good Administration’ in A. Arnull et al. (eds.), Continuity and Change in EU Law (Oxford, 
2008), 157 at p. 168. 
73 Case C-432/05 Unibet [2007] ECR I-2271, para 37. 
74 For example Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld [2007] ECR I-3633, para 46; Case C-411/04 P 
Salzgitter Mannesmann GmbH [2007] ECR I-959, para 33; Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri [2007] ECR I-
11767, para 90 et seq.; Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and al Barakaat [2008] ECR I-6351, 
para 335. 
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the Charter permanently and will increasingly consult it not only as source of interpretation 
of rights, but in the future also as direct binding source of law. 
 
3.2. Structure and substance of the right to be heard of 
Article 41 (2) CFR 
3.2.1. Formation and development of Article 41 (2) CFR 
Article 41 CFR, which guarantees the right to good administration and the therein included 
right to be heard before any adversely measure, can be found in Chapter V of the Charter 
under the headline ‘Citizen’s Rights’. Besides the right to good administration, ‘Citizen’s 
Rights’ contains the right of access to documents in Article 42 CFR, the right to refer to the 
Ombudsman in Article 43 CFR and the right to petition the European Parliament in 
Article 44 CFR. The provision of the right to good administration is structured in four 
paragraphs. Despite its systematic position in the ‘Citizen’s Rights’ chapter, the wording of 
the law shows clearly its status as a human right for ‘every person’. Article 41 (1) CFR 
states that …’every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly 
and within a reasonable time by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union’. 
The incorporation of the right to good administration in general as well as in particular its 
arrangement in the first paragraph is mainly based on the activities of the Ombudsman 
Jacob Söderman. His influence on the drafting of Article 41 of the Charter is apparent. His 
proposals and initiatives concerning a codification of administrative law considerably 
contributed to the inclusion of the right to good administration during the consultations 
about the creation of the Charter. In his famous speech in front of the Convention on the 
draft Charter under the Chairman Roman Herzog on 02 February 2000, he pointed out 
…’that the citizen has a right that his or her affairs be dealt with properly, fairly and 
promptly by an open, accountable and service-minded public administration’.75 The second 
paragraph of Article 41 CFR represents in detail some of the guarantees which are already 
covered by the first paragraph. This is proved by the wording due to which the right to 
good administration ‘includes’ the following rights of the second paragraph. The 
incorporation of the right to good administration into the Charter was the first explicit 
recognition of the right in an international human rights declaration, although it had been 
                                                 
75 Available online at http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/activities/speech.faces (date viewed April 4th 
2012); Charte 4131/00 Contrib 26, at p. 4; Charte 4284/00 Convent 28, at p. 26; concerning the role of the 
Ombudsman regarding the right to good administration see W. Yeng-Seng, ‘Le médiateur européen, artisan 
du developpement du droit à une bonne administration communautaire’ RTDH (2004) 527, at p. 529 et seq. 
and N. Scafarto, ‘Quelques considérations sur le rôle du médiateur européen dans la sauvegarde du principe 
de bonne administration’ RTDE (2007) 899, at p. 899 et seqq. 
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mentioned before in documents of the Council of Europe and in OECD documents.76 One 
of the first legal documents dealing with the principles of good administration was the 
1977 Resolution of the Council of Europe ‘On the protection of the Individuals in Relation 
to the Acts of Administrative Authorities’77 which was the first document on the 
organisation of European administrative procedure. It contained fundamental principles 
concerning the right to be heard, the right of access to information, the right of assistance 
and representation, the obligation to state reasons for decisions and finally the obligation to 
state available remedies against an act by an administration.78 Even if it is in the nature of a 
resolution that it is not legally binding, for the first time a minimum standard of procedural 
guarantees became established in the form that later became concretised in the right to 
good administration of Article 41 CFR. 
Reactions in the doctrine concerning the provision of Article 41 CFR are restrained and 
differentiated.79 This might be reducible to the fact that whereas Article 41 (1) and (2) 
essentially constitute a summary of existing case law, the right of every person to have his 
or her affairs handled ‘fairly’ is in some way new and undetermined. It is striking to see 
that none of the judgements which have been referred to by the Convention in its 
explanatory notes grants this right to be treated ‘fairly’.80 As a result, the Charter surpasses 
the established juridical status with this term. Although the European Ombudsman already 
required a right to be treated ‘fairly’ and its subsequent incorporation into the Charter, this 
does not change the fundamental new creation of an undefined legal term, whose precise 
substance can only be developed and concretised by and by. Due to the legal effect of the 
Charter due to coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, it can be expected that case law will 
precise and concretise this wording and provide a direction for a definition. This 
constitutes the opportunity to challenge the criticism concerning the indefiniteness of the 
provision and further develop this guarantee. 
 
                                                 
76 See below section 5.3.; J. Södermann, ‘Gute Verwaltung als Grundrecht in der Europäischen Union’ Die 
Union (2001) 60, at p. 62. 
77 Resolution of 28 September 1977 No. R 77 (31) of the Council of Europe ‘On the protection of the 
Individuals in Relation to the Acts of Administrative Authorities’. 
78 C. H. Hofmann ‘Good administration in EU law – a fundamental right?’ Bull.dr.h. 13 (2007) 44 at p. 44. 
79 K. Kańska, ‘Towards Administrative Human Rights in the EU’ ELJ 10 (2004) 296, at p. 324 et seqq. is of 
the opinion, that Article 41 CFR cannot provide a solution for political and financial accountability of the 
Union’s administration. C. H. Hofmann ‘Good administration in EU law – a fundamental right?’ Bull.dr.h. 
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80 Explanatory note to Article 41 CFR, Notes from the Praesidium on the draft Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, Charte 4473/00 Convent 49, p. 36. 
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3.2.2. Constituent parts of the right to be heard 
The right to be heard is applicable in the overall administrative procedure and provides 
different components in individual process stages. In its first step, the right to be heard 
requires in principle that the person concerned should be informed of the commencement 
of the proceedings, since without such information the person cannot submit observations 
on the objections.97 This claim is released in all proceedings which are liable to culminate 
in a measure adversely affecting that person and if his or her interests are perceptibly 
affected by a decision taken by a public authority.98 The person concerned has to be given 
sufficient information about the objections made against him or has to be informed about 
the material object of the procedure, in general.99 The right to be informed besides the right 
to express one’s opinion, is a decisive aspect of the right to be heard. 
In performing their duty to provide information, the Union institutions must act with all 
due diligence by seeking to provide the persons concerned with information relevant to the 
defence of their interests. Furthermore they have to choose, if necessary on their own 
initiative, appropriate means of providing such information.100 The institutions have to 
display all factual and legal aspects which led to the procedure and present the possible 
adversely measures which might be taken. 
On the next level, the authorities must give the person concerned the opportunity of 
submitting observations in the matters of fact which it intends to make the basis for its 
decision.101 The question whether an oral hearing is necessary is decided by the Union 
institutions; however, it is not required by the provision.102 
On the third and final level, the right to be heard includes the right of consideration of the 
submitting observations in the course of the decision-making process.103 
 
3.2.3. Who is entitled by Article 41 CFR? 
3.2.3.1. Entitled persons 
According to the wording of Article 41 CFR, the scope of application ratione personae is 
‘every person’. Its systematic position under Chapter V ‘Citizen’s rights’ indicates 
                                                 
97 J. Schwarze, European administrative law (London, 2006), 1335. 
98 Case 17/74 Transocean Marine Paint [1974] 1063, para 15; Case C-32/95 P Lisrestal [1996] ECR I-5373, 
para 21. 
99 K. Kańska, ‘Towards Administrative Human Rights in the EU’ ELJ 10 (2004) 296, at p. 315; P. J. Kuyper 
& T. van Rijn, ‘Procedural guarantees and investigatory methods in European Law’ YEL 2 (1983) 1, at p. 12. 
100 Case C-49/88 Al-Jubail Fertilizer [1991] ECR I-3187, para 15 et seqq. 
101 Case 322/81 Michelin (1983) 3461, para 7; Case C-135/92 Fiskano (1994) ECR I-2885, para 40; Case T-
613/97 Ufex [2000] ECR II-4055, para 85; J. Schwarze, European administrative law (London, 2006), 1358. 
102 Joined Cases 209-215 and 218/78 Van Landewyk [1980] 3125, para 18. 
103 Case C-315/99 P Ismeri Europa Srl [2001] ECR I-5281, para 31 et seq. 
 27
however that the qualification as a human right for every person is not undisputed. Already 
in the course of the Convention the question whether third country nationals should be 
involved in the scope of application was controversially inculded.104 An early draft of the 
Charter intended to grant the right to good administration to persons residing in a Member 
State only.105 This very narrow scope of application regarding the entitled persons was 
extended in the next draft,106 whereas the systematic position under Chapter V ‘Citizen’s 
Rights’ has not been changed.  
Furthermore, the particular constellations coming into question for application of the right 
to good administration are usually not limited to Union citizens. Consequently, the ECJ 
acknowledged a right to be heard for third country nationals in the Al-Jubail Fertilizer 
case.107  
The wording of Article 41 CFR does not expressly distinguish between natural and legal 
persons. The term ‘citizen’ in the headline of Chapter V connotes a natural person rather 
than a corporation. However, the term ‘citizen’ is not used in the wording of Article 41 
CFR, which leads to the assumption that the drafters chose to refer to ‘every person’ 
instead of ‘citizen’ for a reason.108 What is more, the mere fact that ‘every person’ does not 
expressly include legal persons besides natural persons should not lead to the conclusion 
that the former are excluded from the scope of application. This is confirmed by the ECJ’s 
acknowledgement of providing for application of fundamental rights as well as to legal 
persons governed by private law.109 Not least, the ECJ and the General Court concede the 
principle of good administration and in particular the right to be heard to legal persons 
governed by private law in settled case law.110 
The question whether legal persons governed by public law can rely on the Charter in 
general or Article 41 CFR in particular has not been solved yet. Without specific reference 
to the Charter, part of the doctrine is of the opinion that in specific constellations 
fundamental rights can be granted to legal persons governed by public law. There might be 
an analogy to the legal form of a grundrechtstypische Gefährdungslage established in 
German Constitutional Law. This means a situation in which the legal person finds itself in 
a situation where – comparable to natural persons – it sees itself confronted with the 
danger of infringement of rights where there is no reason to distinguish between legal 
                                                 
104 S. Baer, ‘Grundrechtecharta in der Europäischen Union’ ZRP (2000) 361, at p. 364. 
105 See Charte 4170/00 Convent 17, p. 5 referred to as Article E.  
106 See Charte 4284/00 Convent 28, p. 26. 
107 Case C-49/88 Al-Jubail Fertilizer [1991] ECR I-3187, para 15 et seqq. 
108 K. Kańska, ‘Towards Administrative Human Rights in the EU’ ELJ 10 (2004) 296, at p. 308. 
109 See the early Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] 1125, para 4 et seqq.; Case 267/87 
Schärder [1989] 2237, para 15; Case C-18/95 P Baustahlgewerbe [1998] ECR I-8417, para 2.  
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persons of private or public law. Thus, the fundamental rights would be applicable to the 
legal person by virtue of their nature. This legal form might be applicable as well in 
European Law to legal persons of public law, which indeed do fulfil a public service but 
without being controlled by the authorities, maintain their independence and by this are 
protected from government encroachment.111 The ECHR awarded a legal person governed 
by public law in such a comparable case as well fundamental rights as well.112 
On the one hand, providing fundamental rights in general and without exception meets 
strong concerns due to the defensive function of fundamental rights. On the other hand, 
legal persons governed by public law might require a right to be heard for stating their 
positions to the same extent as natural persons, particularly in administrative procedure. 
Granting fundamental rights to legal persons governed by public law cannot directly be 
derived from the wording or meaning and purpose of the Charter but might be derived 
from Union’s general fundamental rights. At least as far as Member States as legal persons 
governed by public law can invoke procedural rights and in particular the right to be heard 
vis-à-vis Union institutions, insofar should other legal persons governed by public law be 
awarded such a right to be heard, in the extent that they are in the mentioned state of a 
grundrechtstypische Gefährdungslage. 
The wording of Article 41 CFR does not mention the Member States as entitled persons of 
the right to good administration. To grant the Member States the right to be heard as 
directly derived from the Charter, an explicit regulation would have been necessary. For 
this reason, even in the prevailing doctrine there is consensus to a great extent, that 
Member States cannot invoke the right to good administration respectively the right to be 
heard as directly derived from the Charter.113 Independent form the Charter, they have 
absolutely to be granted the general rule-of-law principles of a good and sound 
administration as they have been developed by the jurisdiction. Consequently, the ECJ has 
granted the Member States enforceable rights concerning the right to be heard and the 
obligation to state reasons.114 The principles derived from the general principles regarding 
the legal persons’ possibility to be granted fundamental rights are also applicable to the 
Member States. Procedural rights as well as in particular the right to be heard for Member 
States can only be exercised insofar as they are applicable by virtue of their nature. 
Transferring sovereignty rights to the Union might result in a link of subordination which 
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leads to the necessity of defensive rights. This is the case when Member States are 
addressees of a Commission’s decision and as a result find themselves in a comparable 
situation to natural or legal persons governed by private law.115 
Even if it was the primary aim of the Charter to only make visible the rights of the citizens 
and not the ones of the Member States or other legal persons, the application of procedural 
rights could be supported in specific constellations.  
 
3.2.3.2. ‘Affairs’ of the entitled person 
The wording of Article 41 (1) CFR ensures every person’s right to ‘have his or her affairs’ 
handled according to the principle of good administration. The question is how this term 
has to be interpreted and how far-reaching ‘his or her affairs’ are. The term already 
indicates the requirement of a link between the person concerned and the measure to take. 
The existence of the necessary link can undoubtedly be answered in the affirmative with 
regards to those persons, who are a party of the procedure or addressee of a measure or 
decision. To exclude steadfastly third parties off the scope of application would run 
contrary to the aim of the provision and would not be in line with the case law.116 Such a 
link in the sense of ‘his or her affairs’ is given beyond the situation, when a measure 
directly and individually affects the person concerned and entails adverse consequences for 
him or her.117 The admission of a third party to the administrative procedure or his or her 
claim to be admitted has indicative effect. In administrative procedures of specific fields of 
law, rights to be heard are explicitly granted to third parties as well. In the field of 
competition and merger law, for example, applications to be heard on the part of such 
persons shall, where they show a sufficient interest, be granted.118 In other fields, parallels 
might be drawn to the requirements of application to annulment in Article 263 (4) TFEU. It 
should be noted, however, that Article 41 (1) CFR considered individually does not 
provide any stipulation for the third party issue. The wording however indicates a special 
link between the person concerned and the measure. It can be assumed that after becoming 
legally binding the scope of the guarantee will no longer stand back behind the scope of the 
general principle as developed by the ECJ.  
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Indeed, it is demonstrated by the wording of Article 41 (2) CFR, that an individual 
measure which would affect him or her adversely to be taken is required. 
Finally, it is debatable if associations pursuing public concerns can be affected in ‘his or 
her affairs’. The ECJ has denied this question in the BEUC v. Commission119 case and 
ruled that an association – at least in anti-dumping and anti-subsidy proceedings – cannot 
rely on the principle of the right to be heard if there is no specific legislation. The 
association has not been affected adversely because it did not see itself confronted by 
accusations.120 The ECJ would have granted the association the right to be heard, if it had 
been itself directly and adversely affected and had been not just pursuing public concerns. 
 
3.2.4. Who is obliged by Article 41 CFR? 
3.2.4.1. The institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the 
Union – direct implementation of Union law 
The implementation of Union law is ensured by two different types of administration. 
Administrative decisions are taken on European level as well as on national level. The 
direct administration takes place on the European level whereas administrative measures 
on the national level can be described as ‘indirect administration’.121  
As a rule, the implementation of Union law is left to the administrative authorities of the 
Member States.122 This is a result of the principles of conferral and subsidiarity laid down 
in Article 5 (2) and (3) TEU. 
The direct implementation, on the contrary, represents the exceptional case and only 
applies when it is explicitly ordered by primary or secondary law. The direct 
implementation can also be divided in two sections: The area of internal administration123 
and the area administration external to the Union.124 One the one hand, the area of internal 
administration covers matters of personnel, the Union budget as well as internal 
organisation. The area external to the Union on the other hand, covers the direct 
implementation of Union law by Union bodies vis-à-vis Members States and individuals, 
mostly in the area of competition, anti-trust and anti-dumping law, State aid control as well 
as trade and social policies. 
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After coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, Article 298 TFEU implements a specific 
legal basis for European administration. However, it is not the purpose of the provision to 
create a self-contained administrative unit, but the European administration is supposed to 
be comprised of the single institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union.125 
Accordingly, the notion ‘European administration’ of Article 298 TFEU only describes the 
direct implementation of Union law. Therefore Article 298 TFEU does not create 
competences for the indirect implementation of Union law. What is more, Article 298 
TFEU does not contain a legal basis for institutions’ rules for procedure and self-
organisation; this, however is already established by primary law.126 
 
Considering the scope of obligations arising from Article 41 (1) CFR, it explicitly 
addresses the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union. Consequently, when 
in first instance only taking into account the wording of the provision, just the direct 
implementation, as well as the internal as external administration, is concerned.  
The field of application of the Charter is codified in Article 51 (1) CFR. This provision 
obliges in compliance with Article 41 (1) CFR institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of 
the Union. According to Article 13 (1) TEU, the Union’s institutions are the European 
Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Commission, the Court of 
Justice of the European Union, the European Central Bank and the Court of Auditors. The 
term Court of Justice of the European Union includes pursuant to Article 19 (1) TEU the 
Court of Justice, the General Court and specialised courts. The in Article 13 (1) TEU listed 
institutions of the European Central Bank, the European Council as well as the in the term 
of Court of Justice included General Court and specialised courts had not been contained in 
ex-Art. 7 EC and have been added by the Lisbon Treaty. 
Thus, it is debatable, if the number of addressees ina Article 13 (1) TEU that was extended 
by coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty has an effect on the scope of obliged addresses 
of the Charter. Whereas following the draft Charter, the term ‘institutions’ is enshrined in 
Article 7 of the EC Treaty,127 due to the explanations relating to the Charter of 
Fundamental rights, the term ‘institutions’ is now enshrined ‘in the Treaties’ in general.128 
Hence, it can be concluded that the term ‘institutions’ of the Charter changes and develops 
in a linked and accessory way to the terms used by the Treaties. Consequently, the term 
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‘institutions’ of the Charter in Article 41 (1) CFR and Article 51 (1) CFR includes all 
institutions listed in Article 13 (1) TEU. 
According to the explanations of the Charter, the expression ‘bodies, offices and agencies’ 
is commonly used in the Treaties to refer to all the authorities set up by the Treaties or by 
secondary legislation.129 Consequently, the entire scope of European direct administration 
is covered by the Charter. This as well includes the Economic and Social Committee, the 
Committee of the Regions, the European Investment Bank and Europol.130 
It is not quite clear, however, if the named addressees are bound to Article 41 CFR in 
general or if they are only obliged, when acting in the scope of ‘administration’. In the 
course of Article 41 CFR, the term ‘administration’ is only mentioned in Article 41 (2) 
CFR, concerning the right to a reasoned decision. Regarding the right to be heard, no 
explicit reference to the administration is made. The application to the area of 
administration already arises from the headline which names the right to good 
administration without any limitation to a certain paragraph. This result is underlined by 
the genesis of the provision in the Convention,  
Additionally with regards to the genesis of the provision, it is to be assumed, that the 
addressees should only be obliged, when acting as ‘administration’.131 On the contrary, the 
obligation on the contrary has to be denied when acting as judicial or legislative power. 
The following question is what constitutes ‘administration’ on European level. There is no 
clear division of legislative and administrative powers, therefore the principle of separation 
of powers cannot simply be transferred to the European level and certain institutions 
cannot be assigned to specific functions or powers. European administration can be defined 
functionally as the implementation of Union law in individual cases or concrete 
situations.132 Particular forms of action are not required. Hence, not only the decision 
pursuant to Article 288 (4) TFEU which as case-by-case decision can be compared most 
likely to the German administrative act Verwaltungsakt, § 35 VwVfG133 comes into 
question, but also all other forms of action, as far as they serve the implementation of 
Union law in concrete situations. The term ‘administration’ therefore should not be 
understood in a subjective sense as organs of the administration but regardless of the 
institution which performs them.134 
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This interpretation corresponds to the wording of Article 41 (2) CFR. Where the right to a 
reasoned decision which as well can be found in Article 41 (2) CFR is only granted in the 
context of ‘decisions’, the right to be heard is explicitly applicable to ‘individual 
measures’. Therefore it does not require a particular or specific form of action but is 
covering all activities of an administrative character. 
Hence, the definition of ‘administration’ cannot be determined by the institution or the 
form of action alone. Additionally, the necessary kind of activity can constitute any 
activity of an administrative character.135 According to settled case law, the principles of 
good administration are not only applicable to individual and concrete forms of action. 
However, they are applicable in all areas where the Union institutions have a discretion or 
wide power of appraisal, respect for the safeguards guaranteed by the Union legal order in 
administrative procedures is of even more fundamental importance.136 Those guarantees 
include, in particular, the duty of the competent institution to carefully and impartially 
examine all relevant aspects of the individual case, the right of the person concerned to 
make his views known and to have an adequately reasoned decision.137 In these cases, the 
concreteness of the administrative situation is the decisive approach. 
This becomes even more clearly in some ECJ’s decisions, where it gradually qualified the 
adoption of certain regulations as ‘administration’. Already in 1973, it stated tht the 
adjustment method in the Community’s Staff Regulations only constituted an 
implementing measure of an administrative rather than a legislative nature.138 In the anti-
dumping Al-Jubail Fertilizer case, the ECJ held that the right to be heard must be observed 
not only where it might lead to penalties, but also where the investigative proceedings prior 
to the adoption of the duty might directly and adversely affect the undertakings and entail 
adverse consequences for them.139 
This case law provides a guideline for the obligations for the Union’s institutions, bodies, 
offices and agencies, which as well have effect on the scope of the Charter, especially after 
coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the legal force of the Charter. The Union’s 
authorities are obliged by Article 41 CFR when implementing an activity of an 
administrative character, whereas the term ‘administration’ does not require a specific form 
of action. The emphasis is put on the individual and concrete form of action. 
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3.2.4.2. The Member States – indirect implementation of 
Union law 
Like stated before, the direct implementation of Union law constitutes an exception. The 
indirect implementation is the usual practice due to the principles of conferral and 
subsidiarity laid down in Article 5 (2) and (3) TEU. 
The greater part of Union law is implemented by national authorities. The main areas of 
indirect implementation are the common agricultural policy and the external protection of 
the Union through the common customs tariff.140 
The traditional distinction between direct implementation by the authority of the Union 
itself and indirect implementation by the Member States is still decisive today.141 In the 
course of structural changes of Union law a new category of implementing Union law 
evolved. In the course of phased proceedings, the administration of the particular scheme is 
divided or shared between the Union and the Member States as in the context of Structural 
Funds.142 These phased proceedings combine elements of direct and indirect administration 
to a kind of joint administration. Therefore, the prevailing literature already describes this 
principle of co-operation as a third stand-alone category of implementing Union law,143 
namely ‘shared administration’144 or ‘integrated administration’.145 
The indirect implementations can be divided in two areas as well. On the one hand, the 
implementing bodies can act directly on the basis of provisions of Union law, for example 
regulations. Fields of application are in particular European Customs law or the 
agricultural sector. On the other hand, the implementing bodies can act on the basis of 
national rules which render Union law in particular directives, concrete and apt for 
implementation,146 for example the implementation of directives. 
The Member States are in principle competent for the administrative implementation of 
Union law according to their constitutional and administrative provisions.147 This comes as 
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a result form the procedural autonomy of the Member States,148 which is from now on laid 
down in Article 291 (1) TFEU, codifying that Member States shall adopt all measures of 
national law necessary to implement legally binding Union acts as well as the fact that 
there is a lack of European regulation in the field of administrative procedure. The general 
competence of the Member States for the administrative implementation of Union law is 
not unlimited. To secure the uniform application of Union law, the limits of the principles 
of equivalence and effectiveness apply, which result from the effet utile, codified in 
Article 4 (3) TEU. The principle of equivalence requires that actions based upon Union 
law brought before the domestic courts should not be furnished with less favourable 
remedies and procedural rules than those available in respect of similar actions based upon 
purely national law. This does not only apply to procedural rules before national courts, but 
also to those applied by the national authorities in reaching administrative decisions.149  
According to the principle of effectiveness, in the area of indirect implementation it also 
requires that national remedies and procedural rules should not render the exercise of 
Union law as virtually impossible or excessively difficult.150 
The new Article 197 TFEU, which is part of Title XXIV ‘Administrative Cooperation’, 
demands that the effective implementation of Union law by the Member States shall be 
regarded as a matter of common interest. This covers as well the indirect administration , 
which is essential for the proper functioning of the Union. However, this new Article 197 
TFEU strengthens the existing basics of the European administrative legal order but does 
not modify its essential underlying competence structure.151 Describing the indirect 
implementation of Union law as a matter of common interest, it can be regarded as a first 
step to administrative integration. Most of all, it clarifies the duty to loyalty and obligation 
to cooperate in good faith under Article 5 (3) TEU. 
 
Coming to the consequences of indirect implementation concerning the right to good 
administration, Article 41 CFR does not explicitly name the Member States as addressees 
of this provision. Article 51 (1) CFR, which sets the field of application of the Charter, 
states that its provisions are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of 
the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only 
when they are implementing Union law. Even if this does not solve the problem to what 
extent the Member States are bound to the right to be heard as stated in Article 41 (2) CFR, 
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Article 51 (1) CFR reveals that a binding is only given in area of indirect implementation 
of Union law.. 
As already stated, the Member States are not explicitly mentioned in the wording of 
Article 41 CFR. What is more, they do not generally constitute bodies of the Union and do 
not fall within the scope of the obliged institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the 
Union. Basically, the Charter’s field of application is regulated in Article 51 (1) CFR. By 
virtue of its wording, the Charter also applies to Member States, but only when they are 
implementing Union law. Due to this fact, the question arises, if and to what extent the 
Member States are bound by the right to be heard of Article 41 (1) CFR. 
The explicit non-mentioning of the Member States in the wording of Article 41 (1) CFR 
might limit the field of application in the way that an obligation of the Member States to 
ensure the rights enshrined in Article 41 CFR does not exist. However, the indirect 
implementation of Union law is the normal case and the direct implementation only 
constitutes an exception. Would the obligation be limited to the direct implementation of 
Union law, the right to good administration as codified in Article 41 CFR would leave out 
of its scope a vast amount of administrative proceedings concerning application of Union 
law.152 This would limit the practical effect of this provision on a large scale. By narrowing 
the field of application, the Charter would severely lack efficiency but also trustworthiness. 
 
The case law of the ECJ and the General Court, however, apply the reach of the principles 
of good administration also to Member States administrations when acting ‘within the 
sphere of Community law’.153 This is as well in line with the Lisrestal case law in the area 
of co-administration.154 After coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty and thus the legal 
binding of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Member States are, when implementing 
Union law or general within the sphere of Union law, bound to the Charter in general. 
What is more, they are bound to the ECJ’s case law as well as the general principles and 
therefore to the right of good administration. The right to good administration of the 
Charter is characterised by the jurisdiction of the Courts of the Union.  
Thus, the Member States’ binding in the area of indirect implementation has to be 
presumed. What is more, it is debatable, whether this applies to both areas of indirect 
implementation or if it has to be further differentiated. By deriving the obligation, it 
unquestionably includes the indirect implementation, when bodies act directly on the basis 
of Union law, thus implement direct applicable primary or secondary legislation. The 
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justification of a binding in the area of indirect implementation, when the bodies act on the 
basis of national rules is even harder. The arguments stated above generally do also apply 
in this area; however, they have to be given less weight due to the procedural autonomy of 
the Member States. The Member States have sole authority by implementing Union 
regulations. What is more, by executing national acts on the implementation of directives, 
it might be difficult in specific cases to decide whether it still involves implementing 
Union law or if it constitutes only solely national issues. As a result, this would, lead to the 
necessity of a thorough examination and analysis as well as decision on a case-by-case 
basis in a large number of cases. Therefore, a general binding of the Member States in 
indirect implementation in the area where bodies act on the basis of national rules, seems 
not absolutely necessary. In fact, the general rules of good administration should apply 
here, what in combination with the requirements of Article 4 (3) TEU might modify the 
national administrative procedure in a citizen-protecting kind of way. 
Due to the legal binding of the Charter, it can be assumed that the ECJ will adopt a clear 
position as well. What is more, it likely will concretise the substance and also the scope of 
the binding of the rule in the following way: The Member States explicitly will be named 
as addressees of Article 41 CFR in the area of indirect implementation, at least when 
bodies act directly on the basis of Union law.  
 
3.2.5. Delimitation to the right of access to the file 
The right of every person to have access to his or her file which is enshrined in the second 
indent of Article 41 (2) CFR also has its origin in the general principles and also belongs to 
the rights of defence,155 even though the Courts of the Union only slowly acknowledged 
and accepted this right.156 Furthermore, this guarantee only applies to ‘one’s file’ of a 
person which means that it excludes access to information to files of other parties and thus 
does not constitute a general access to the file.157  
In comparison to the right of access to documents of Article 42 CFR, the scope of 
protection is narrower due to the fact that the person has a right to access only to ‘one’s 
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file’. The right of access to a file could be treated as a component of the right to be 
heard.158 However, the drafters of the Charter chose to treat it as an autonomous right.159 
The Union Courts however emphasise on the intimate interdependence between the right to 
be heard and the right to access to the file or the subsidiary nature of the latter in relation to 
the former and tend to treat the right of access to a file as a necessary prerequisite of an 
effective right to be heard160 and consequently as pertaining to the substance of this 
guarantee.161 What is more, the emphasis of the access to a file lies on written information 
and that is why it ensures the effective realisation of the right to be heard. Without access 
to all non-confidential files, the person concerned is not able to adequately exercise his 
rights in the way he or she is entitled to. The General Court as well held that the access to 
the file is one of the procedural guarantees intended to protect the rights of the defence and 
to ensure, in particular, that the right to be heard can be exercised effectively.162 With 
explicit focus on the wording of the Charter, it has to be presumed that the right to the 
access to the file constitutes a fundamental procedural right of its own and thus has to be 
treated separately from the right to be heard. Despite this fact, it has the functioning of a 
preliminary stage to the realisation of the right to be heard. 
 
3.2.6.  Scope of protection, infringement and justification 
The personal scope of protection guarantees every natural or legal person – as well as in a 
restricted sense the Member States – the right to be heard vis-à-vis the institutions, bodies, 
offices and agencies of the Union. It guarantees the protection of the right vis-à-vis the 
Member States in so far as they indirectly implement Union law by acting directly on the 
basis of Union law as well. Concerning the scope of protection with regards to content, the 
right to be heard of Article 41 (2) CFR has to be ensured on three levels. On the first level, 
the person concerned has to be informed about the administrative proceedings against him. 
On the second level, the authorities must give the person concerned the opportunity of 
submitting observations in the matters of fact. On the third and final level, the right to be 
heard includes the right of consideration of the submitting observations in the course of the 
decision-making process. The right is limited to the affairs of the person concerned and is 
only applicable to administrative measures. 
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Besides these already mentioned criteria, the scope of protection requires an ‘individual’ 
measure which affects the person ‘adversely’, whereas the notion of ‘measure’ does not 
require a certain form of action as shown above. The person who invokes the right has to 
be adversely affected; an adverse impact on a third party should not be sufficient. The 
measure affects a person adversely when his or her financial or other interests are 
concerned in a negative way. It might be conceivable to refer to the ‘direct and individual 
concern’ of Article 263 (4) TFEU or to require that the interests have to be ‘perceptibly 
affected’.163 A measure being adversely and favouring at the same time has to be examined 
regarding its main focus. 
The earlier jurisdiction classified a measure to be adversely in cases where sanctions, in 
particular fines and penalty payments, might be imposed.164 Later, it held that the right to 
be heard was applicable in all proceedings initiated against a person liable to culminate in a 
measure adverse to him or her and applied even in the absence of specific rules concerning 
the proceedings in question.165  
A measure should be ‘individual’ when it is addressed to one or more persons; 
administrative proceedings leading to adoption of general measures are generally excluded 
from the scope of application. The courts however recognised that a regulation, although 
general in scope, might affect the position of an individual.166 It is submitted that the right 
should rather be determined according to the interest that an individual has in the outcome 
of the proceedings and not according to the character of a measure being individual or 
general.167 What is more, the characteristic feature of a measure being ‘individual’ does not 
inevitably limit the scope to the addressee of a measure. Thus it becomes clear that notions 
of ‘individual’ and ‘adversely’ are mainly already included in the requirement of ‘his or 
her affairs’ and are only concretised in regard of the impact and significant affect. 
An infringement of the right to be heard has to be considered when the person concerned 
has not been granted the right to be heard even in parts of the guarantee or has been 
prevented to the execution of his right. Such a restriction might alternatively take place on 
every level of protection.  
In contrast to the right of access to the file of the second indent of Article 41 (2) CFR, 
which requires to respect the legitimate interests of confidentiality and professional and 
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business secrecy, the right to be heard of the first indent of Article 41 (2) CFR does not 
show any written limitation. However, the right may be limited when the conditions set out 
in Article 52 CFR are met. These conditions require that any infringement must be 
provided for by law and respect the essence of the rights or freedom at stake. Furthermore 
they have to be proportionate, necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest 
recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.168 
Concerning the specific arrangement of these limitations, it is necessary to consult and 
examine the scope of protection in the light of the courts’ jurisdiction. In that respect the 
right or the obligation to be heard does not apply unconditionally and might be dropped 
under certain circumstances. Advocate General Warner demanded a limitation of the 
principle of the right to be heard in the NTN Toyo Bearing case when an unconditional 
guarantee is opposed to the objective being pursued or to the need for efficient 
administration or is impossible due to any other reasons or impracticable.169 This might be 
the case when the person concerned cannot be reached or impedes the receipt of 
information.170 In the National Panasonic case, Advocate General Warner went so far to 
determine that the right does not only not apply without exceptions but that such an 
exception is appropriate when the pursued objective might only possibly be frustrated.171 
What is more, the scope of the obligation can depend on the intensity of the infringement. 
In cases of insignificant impairment, the right to be heard may not be granted or limited.172 
This may include measures for collecting evidence. Due to the ECJ’s judgement in the 
National Panasonic case, a review procedure can be initiated without previous notification 
when the loss of evidence is presumed.173 To ensure the objective pursued, it might be 
admissible to hold a hearing after the adoption of the measure. It is debatable, however, if 
the obligation to a grant a hearing can be limited in cases of imminent danger when 
immediate measures have to be adopted. This has to be the exceptional case and the 
measure should only be adopted without a hearing in due consideration and following the 
principle of proportionality. Additionally, the urgency must not be caused by the 
administrative body itself. The right to be heard can be dropped as well when the 
administrative procedure is the result of a request of the person concerned and he already 
has presented the relevant facts.174 This includes all factual and legal facts which constitute 
the basis of the authority’s decision.  
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If none of those exceptions are relevant in the specific case, the infringement of the right to 
be heard of Article 41 (2) CFR is not justified and thus constitutes a procedural error. 
Special attention is to be given to the fact that on European level a cure of procedural 
errors is only possible during administrative proceedings and not in court proceedings 
which means that the measure concerned is void.175 Apart from that, the jurisdiction 
requires a causality imputation. However, in order for an infringement of the right to be 
heard to result in annulment, it is necessary to establish that, had it not been for such an 
irregularity, the outcome of the procedure might have been different.176 
 
3.2.7. The Code of Good Administrative Behaviour 
The incorporation of the right to good administration in the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
is mainly based on the activities of the Ombudsman Jacob Söderman. Even long before its 
proclamation, he called as well for an adoption of a Code of Good Administrative 
Behaviour by all Union institutions and bodies which concretises the right to good 
administration of Article 41 CFR. The role of the Ombudsman is defined in Article 43 
CFR as well as in Article 228 TFEU. He is ‘empowered to receive complaints from any 
citizen of the Union or any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in 
a Member State concerning instances of maladministration in the activities of the Union 
institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, with the exception of the ECJ’s acting in its 
judicial role’. Additionally, he is completely independent in the performance of his duties. 
In 1999, he drafted a model code which the Parliament endorsed as a European Code of 
Good Administrative Behaviour in form of a resolution.177 Furthermore, the European 
Parliament called on the Commission to submit a proposal on the basis of ex-Article 308 
EC for a regulation containing the Code. 
According to the present Ombudsman, Nikiforos Diamandouros the Code tells citizens 
what the right to good administration actually means in practice and what they precisely 
can expect from the European administration.178 
With regard to the personal scope of application, due to Article 2 the Code applies to all 
officials and other servants to whom the Staff Regulations and the Conditions of 
employment of other servants apply, in their relations with the public. The notion ‘public’ 
refers to natural and legal persons, whether they reside or have their registered office in a 
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Member State or not. The material scope of application, Article 3, establishes that the Code 
contains the general principles of good administrative behaviour which apply to all 
relations of the institutions and their administrations with the public unless they are 
governed by specific provisions. All rights contained in Article 41 CFR are also included 
in the Code and are concretised by it. Beyond that, the Code contains additional provisions 
for administrative procedure such as legitimate expectations, consistency and advice 
(Article 10), acknowledgement of receipt (Article 14), obligation to transfer to the 
competent service (Article 15) as well as the keeping of adequate records (Article 24). 
Concerning procedural rules of behaviour, the rule of courtesy (Article 12) requires that the 
officials shall be service-minded, correct, courteous and accessible in relations with the 
public.  
Even the right to be heard was included in the Code and became more differentiated with 
regards to Article 41 CFR. What is more, it goes beyond the wording of Article 41 CFR. 
Due to Article 16 No. 1, in all ‘cases where the rights or interests of individuals are 
involved, the officials shall ensure that, at every stage in the decision making procedure, 
the rights of defence are respected’. The notion of ‘involved’ is much wider than ‘adverse 
effect’.179 This leads to the fact that Article 16 even includes the rejection of a preferential 
treatment as well. Article 16 No. 2 states that ‘member of the public shall have the right, in 
cases where a decision affecting his rights or interests has to be taken, to submit written 
comments and when needed, to present oral observations before the decision is taken’. 
Again, Article 16 deals with the notion of ‘affecting’ and not ‘adversely affecting’. What is 
more, it refers to ‘public’ and not ‘individuals’. This includes activities such as public 
hearings or similar. In fact, this is an undefined legal concept to be applied case by case, 
prior to specific assessment.180 The right to be heard of Article 16 thus goes beyond the 
wording of Article 41 CFR. However it concretises the right in most parts in the course of 
the ECJ’s jurisdiction to the principles of good administration.  
The Code still has no legal binding force. Even a proposal for a regulation has not been 
submitted yet. In most parts it contains already codified rules or those developed by the 
jurisdiction of the Union’s courts. 
While the regulation was intended to be based on ex-Article 308 EC which now would be 
Article 352 TFEU, after coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, new opportunities 
occurred. The adequate legal basis for such a regulation would now be Article 298 TFEU. 
As already stated, the notion ‘European administration’ only means the direct 
administration and does not create any competences for the indirect implementation of 
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Union law. A regulation on this legal basis would constitute a substantial codification of a 
part of the European administrative procedure. It is remarkable that such a partly 
codification on European level seems to be within the realms of possibility. 
A legal binding force of the Code or a codification of part of the European administrative 
procedure in the area of direct administration might act as a role model even with regards 
to national administrative procedures. 
 
4. The rights to be heard and Article 6 ECHR 
4.1. Relevance of a right to be heard derived from the ECHR 
The Union’s accession to the Convention on Human Rights has not yet taken place but 
Article 6 (2) TEU now clearly empowers the Union to finally accede the Convention. Even 
before coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty the fundamental rights, as guaranteed in the 
Convention, had constituted general principles of the Union’s law and already had 
outstanding importance as source of interpretation of rights. Even the ECJ referred to the 
Convention at a very early stage.181 In the Schmidberger case the ECJ emphasised the 
‘special significance’ of the ECHR.182  
The references to the guarantees granted by the ECHR included not only the wording of its 
provision but also the jurisdiction of the European Court on Human Rights, which thus 
further concretises the fundamental rights of the general principles. 
Regarding a right to be heard derived from the ECHR, the right to a fair trial as stated in 
Article 6 ECHR comes to mind, which can be seen as one of the most fundamental 
principles of a democratic society in terms of the Convention. 
The ECJ already expressly referred to Article 6 ECHR before coming into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty concerning the requirement of judicial control which is laid down in 
Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention.183  
 
4.2. The application of ‘Civil Rights’ in the area of administration 
According to the wording, Article 6 (1) ECHR assures that in the determination of his civil 
rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him everyone is entitled to a fair 
and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
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established by law. This raises the question, whether Article 6 (1) ECHR covers the 
administration as well.184 The determining factor for this question is the meaning of ‘civil 
rights’ or ‘droits de caractère civil’. The simple wording, however, does not suggest 
expanding the field of application to administration at first view. 
An expansion to the public sector can be observed anyhow. The ECHR did expand the 
interpretation of ‘civil rights’ in particular administrative contestations.185 The state’s 
classification of the title or obligation is not decisive for the qualification as ‘civil right’. In 
fact, those have an autonomous meaning in Article 6 ECHR.186  
Certainly, the ECHR has not yet committed itself to a concrete definition of this meaning. 
The expansion of the field of application is still based on an individual and casuistic 
basis.187 
Firstly, it applies to rights and obligations in the relationships between private persons. 
Often the key determinant in questions of an application to the area of administration or 
involving state action in general is whether the right or obligation in question is pecuniary 
in nature. Or otherwise, whether the state action that is decisive for the right nonetheless 
has pecuniary consequences for the applicant.188. However, this scope of application is 
limited. The guarantee of Article 6 (1) ECHR does not apply when the state is acting 
within one of the areas that still form part of the essence of public authorities’ 
prerogatives.189 Hence, Article 6 (1) ECHR does not apply to tax cases.190 
The Court adopts a restrictive interpretation of the exceptions to the safeguards of Article 6 
ECHR, which was the case in Vilho Eskelinen where the Court ruled that some disputes 
concerning employment in the public services fall within Article 6 ECHR. 
Political rights and obligations, as well as questions of entry, conditions of stay and 
removal of aliens do not fall within Article 6 ECHR.191 
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In summary, contestations concerning ‘civil rights’ are in general not limited to actions 
between private parties. In certain cases, mainly when the decision might have pecuniary 
consequences for the applicant, state action or the area of administration can also be 
covered by ‘civil rights’. The ECHR emphasised, that even though the meaning of ‘civil 
rights’ has to be interpreted autonomously, Article 6 (1) ECHR may not be interpreted in a 
way as it would not contain the limitation to ‘civil rights and obligations’.192 
 
4.3. Applicability beyond court proceedings?  
Despite the expansion of the scope of application of Article 6 (1) ECHR beyond the 
wording even on certain administrative cases, the wording as well demands an 
‘independent and impartial tribunal’, thus proceeding before a court.193 Accordingly, 
Article 6 (1) ECHR only covers court proceedings and not administrative procedure. 
Comparable to the ‘civil rights’, the term of tribunal has an autonomous meaning as well. 
According to Article 6 (1) ECHR the tribunal has to be independent, impartial and 
established by law. 
It is characterised by its judicial function, independence, impartiality and has a set of rules 
of procedure by which it operates.194 Furthermore, it has to be competent to take legally 
binding decisions.195 
The fact that a body completes other tasks as well, such as administrative functions, does 
not prevent it being a tribunal when exercising its judicial function.196  
It occurs that the autonomous approach on the one hand allows the Convention bodies to 
consider multiple varieties of national decision-making bodies as tribunal in the sense of 
Article 6 (1) ECHR, thus the national qualification as tribunal does not constitute a 
requirement for its qualification on the European level. One the other hand the 
requirements for the qualification as tribunal on European level are however quite strictly 
predetermined so that in fact the Member States are not able to exercise considerable 
discretion. The requirements in terms of independence and impartiality apply to the 
relation of the tribunal to the parties, to the legislative and to executive authorities.197 In 
order to establish the independence and impartiality, regard must be paid to the manner of 
appointment of its members and their term of office, to the existence of guarantees against 
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outside pressures and to the question whether the body presents an appearance of 
independence.198 
The criteria of independence is generally not matched by the Commission of the European 
Union, even if it has to observe the general procedural guarantees,199 Hence, the 
Commission does not constitute a tribunal in the autonomous sense of the Convention.200 
The administration in general, respectively single administration bodies, does not match 
the criteria of independence. In most cases they are subject to directives; in addition, the 
periods of establishment as well as the possibility of dismissing members do not match the 
criteria of the ECHR’s jurisdiction. The Court still takes the view that Article 6 (1) ECHR 
is only applicable to Court proceedings and does not constitute a general rule for other 
procedures, respectively administrative procedures.201  
However, the ECHR developed certain constellations concerning the application of 
Article 6 (1) ECHR in the context of administrative decisions.  
 
4.4. The application of ‘Criminal Charge’ in the area of 
administration 
Article 6 (1) ECHR also grants the right to a fair and public hearing in the determination of 
any criminal charge. 
It is debatable, if and under which conditions an administrative procedure can fall under 
the conception of ‘criminal charge’. Following the ECHR’s jurisdiction, ‘criminal charge’ 
has to be interpreted autonomously as well. The interpretation of the term of tribunal also 
has an autonomous meaning.202 
The ECHR’s established case-law sets out three criteria, known as the ‘Engel criteria’ to be 
considered in determining whether or not there is a ‘criminal charge’.203 The first criterion 
is the legal classification of the offence under national law. Every charge which falls under 
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criminal law of a Member State generally also falls under ‘criminal charge’ and this 
qualification will not be challenged by the ECHR. If the issue is not qualified as ‘criminal’ 
in the national law, the second criteria applies which is the very nature of the offence. By 
the use of this criterion, the ECHR autonomously reviews the scope of the relevant 
provision. First of all, this concerns the circle of its addressees, whether the norm is only 
addressed to a specific group or whether it is a norm of generally binding character. The 
first case indicates a disciplinary character of the provision and thus does not constitute a 
‘criminal charge’.204 Additionally, it has to be examined whether the measure is of 
preventive repressive character, where only the last one relates to a ‘criminal charge’. 
The third criterion is the degree of severity of the penalty that the person risks incurring. 
Imprisonment is considered to be the criminal penalty par excellence, unless it is, by its 
nature, duration or manner of execution ‘not appreciably detrimental’. It gives an otherwise 
disciplinary or administrative procedure a criminal character to such an extent that 
Article 6 ECHR must be held applicable.205 
The relevant approach is the maximum penalty that may be imposed by the authority, that 
is to say in this respect not the actually imposed penalty but the maximum the person 
concerned risked when committing the offence is decisive in this respect.206 
The second and third criteria are alternatives and not necessarily cumulative. 
This does not exclude a cumulative approach where a separate analysis of each criterion 
does not make it possible to reach a clear conclusion to the existence of a ‘criminal 
charge’.207 Additionally, it is important if a fine can be turned into a prison sentence in the 
case of default of payment.208 Due to the wide circle of addressees, the ECHR indicated 
that the German Ordnungswidrigkeitenrecht also constitutes a ‘criminal charge’. The Court 
indicated in the Öztürk Case that it does not conflict with the Convention to distinguish 
between different categories of offences but that such a classification is decisive for the 
question whether Article 6 ECHR is applicable. In this case the offence was not qualified 
under German law as criminal but as a regulatory offence.209 Administrative sanctions thus 
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can be categorised as ‘criminal charge’ under certain conditions. In due consideration of 
the ‘Engel criteria’ these are especially the nature of the offence and that of the sanction 
that may be imposed, as well as the degree of severity of the penalty, irrespective of 
whether they formally have that criminal character under domestic law. 
 
4.5. Indication of the principles of Article 6 ECHR for 
administrative procedure 
According to previous considerations, a general applicability of Article 6 (1) ECHR on 
administrative procedure has to be rejected. 
The wording of Article 6 ECHR requires that a tribunal has to be seised and only 
guarantees protection in the determination of civil rights and obligations or of any criminal 
charge. 
The European Commission of Human Rights already decided at an early stage that 
Article 6 ECHR only applies to proceedings of courts of law and not to administrative 
decisions. What is more, it decided that the right to have a purely administrative decision 
based upon proceedings comparable to those prescribed by Article 6 ECHR is not included 
as such among the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention.210  
Consequently, the opportunity for an analogy to court proceedings has been excluded by 
the Commission. As a matter of fact, an analogy already fails with regards to the lack of an 
unintentional gap in the law as well as the lack of comparability of administrative 
procedure with court proceedings on the one hand and civil and criminal matters on the 
other hand. 
In contrast to the not given opportunity of an analogous application of Article 6 (1) ECHR 
to administrative procedure, the Council considered to enact a new Article 6 a ECHR. With 
this provision, the scope of application should be extended to public law and to 
administrative decisions in particular. This approach has thus not been pursued.211  
The ECHR, however, considers an advance effect of Article 6 (1) ECHR to the upstream 
administrative procedure, if it is formative for the subsequent court procedure. Thus, it at 
least allows Article 6 (1) ECHR an indicative effect for the upstream administrative 
procedure.212 First of all, this applies to the reasonable-time and the statement of grounds 
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requirement,213 but may be equally extended to the right to be heard. Thus a general 
transmission of the guarantees provided by Article 6 (1) ECHR on European administrative 
procedure has to be answered in the negative. However, they have to be granted indicative 
effect.214  
What is more, it is important to fulfil these requirements not only in administrative 
procedure, but also in the subsequent court proceeding. A fulfilment of the requirement of 
a hearing in administrative procedure only cannot be sufficient at all.  
It is an obligatory condition for the applicability that there is a possibility of judicial review 
or in some cases an appeal on the merits of administrative decisions that are directly 
decisive for civil rights and obligations or a criminal charge by a body that complies with 
Article 6 ECHR.215 The courts of judicial review are obliged by Article 6 (1) ECHR, so 
that at this stage protection is ordered by the Convention at the latest. Meeting the 
requirements of Article 6 ECHR only in the upstream administrative procedure cannot be 
sufficient in reverse. 
The question of the expansion of the scope of protection of Article 6 ECHR has been 
discussed and criticized by part of the doctrine as well.216 
By virtue of the right to a fair trial and its incorporated right to be heard as a general 
principle of Union’s law and the legal binding of Article 41 CFR, the necessary procedural 
rights are already guaranteed in a normative as well as in a ‘de facto’ way. Thus, effective 
protection of the right to be heard does not depend on an explicit expansion of Article 6 
ECHR on European administrative procedure. 
 
4.6. Substance of the guarantee 
Due to the fact that the question of the indicative effect of Article 6 ECHR for the 
administrative procedure is answered in the affirmative, the substance of the guarantee has 
to be examined. 
Article 6 ECHR requires a fair hearing. The notion of ‘hearing’ may be equated in this 
context with that of ‘trial’ or ‘trial proceeding’. Additionally, it should not be seen as 
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equivalent to ‘hearing in person’ or ‘oral hearing’, although these two aspects may be 
elements of the notion of fair and public hearing as contained in Article 6 ECHR.217  
Article 6 ECHR consists of a variety of specific rights, inter alia the right to a fair hearing.  
In proceedings which affect civil rights and obligations, the concept of equality of arms is 
essential part of the right to a fair trial and thus the right to a fair hearing. It was first 
mentioned in the Neumeister case218 and requires a fair balance between the parties. In the 
context of civil cases between private parties, the procedural equality does not have to be 
absolute. What matters is that each party is afforded a reasonable opportunity to present izd 
case including izs evidence under conditions that do not place it at a substantial 
disadvantage towards the other side.219 
It as well applies to criminal cases, where the very character of the proceeding involves a 
fundamental inequality of the parties. Thus, in criminal proceedings, if the prosecution 
enjoys a significant procedural advantage, there will not be a reasonable equality of arms 
between the parties.220 The same applies to administrative procedures.221 
The principle of equality of arms, that is closely connected to the right to adversarial 
proceedings, entails that the parties must have the same access to the records and other 
documents pertaining to the case, at least insofar as these may play a part in the formation 
of the court’s opinion.222 
Closely related to equality of arms is the right to have an adversarial trial which needs to 
be ensured both in civil and criminal proceedings. This means the opportunity for the 
parties to have knowledge of and comment on the observation filed or evidence adduced 
by the other party.223 In order for the adversarial process to work effectively it is important 
that relevant material is available to both parties. 
Additionally, the right to a reasoned decision is part of the right to a fair hearing; even if it 
is not expressively mentioned by Article 6 ECHR. This also has been recognised by the 
Court.224 
Concerning the right to be present at the trial, it depends on the nature of the proceedings 
whether a failure to allow the individual accused or in area of civil litigation to attend in 
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person will constitute a violation of Article 6 (1) ECHR. As a general rule, an accused 
should always be present at first instance trial but there may be exceptions as far as trials in 
second or third instance are concerned. Moreover, in principle an exception is permissible 
only if the accused person was entitled to be present at a hearing at first instance.225 
However, this, is less strict in civil proceedings.226 
It is not sufficient that the criminal defendant or civil party is present in court. In addition 
he must be able to participate effectively in the proceedings.227 
 
5. The right to be heard as a general principle of European Union’s law 
5.1. The constitutional traditions common to the Member States 
5.1.1. The right to be heard as a general principle 
According to Article 6 (3) TEU fundamental rights as they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States shall constitute general principles of the Union’s 
law. A right to be heard in administrative procedure or the basic thought of good 
administration is part of several constitutions of the Member States.228 The right to be 
heard in administrative procedure is explicitly guaranteed in Article 105 c) of the Spanish 
Constitution,229 the right to good administration is literally fixed in Article 97 of the Italian 
Constitution.230 
The principle of the rule of law is common to all Member States’ constitutional traditions 
and constitutes acquis communautaire and a value on which the Union is founded 
according to Article 2 TEU. Even if Article 6 (3) TEU talks about the constitutional 
tradition as source of law, the ECJ obviously refers not only to the Member States’ 
Constitutions themselves, but as well to the implementation in the national administrative 
law.231 Thus, the ECJ uses the methods of comparative law to develop general principles of 
procedural rights. 
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The fundamental idea of the much quoted wording of ‘Verwaltungsrecht als konkretisiertes 
Verfassungsrecht’232, meaning ‘administrative law as materialised constitutional law’,233 
has been picked up in a lot of Member States. The emphasis on the rules of the defence in 
the corresponding laws on administrative procedure therefore lies on the implementation of 
constitutional principles. 
The systems of the United Kingdom and Germany are in the centre of interest as the 
currently exercise decisive influence in the field of European administrative procedure.234 
Especially with regards to the safeguarding of a fair administrative procedure, it is the 
influence of the English and German administrative law which is most visible.235 
 
5.1.2. The United Kingdom 
British law had a decisive impact on the development of European procedural rights.236 
Even by developing the right to be heard as a general principle, the ECJ referred to British 
law traditions as the principle of fairness and individual procedural rights.237 In his opinion 
in the Transocean Marine Paint case, Advocate General Warner reached the conclusion, 
that there should be a general recognition of the British audi alteram partem as rule of 
natural justice on European level to establish the right to be heard.238 
To begin with, it should be pointed to the fact, that there are different legal orders in the 
United Kingdom; England and Wales with its ‘true’ common law system on the one hand 
and Scotland with its special rules on the other, even if the differences regarding the 
principles of the natural justice rule are negligible.239 
The United Kingdom does not have a ‘Constitution’ in the sense of a continental European 
thought of a codified Constitution.240 A written or formal Constitution does not exist; the 
existing Constitution moreover is a result of an historic development. For this reason, it is 
not always clear which sources of law can be correctly labelled constitutional and which 
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sources are non-constitutional sources of law241 and belong to ‘ordinary law’. However, the 
United Kingdom does possess a body of legal and other rules by which the process of 
government is regulated. Therefore it has a Constitution in the functional sense.242 The 
Constitution hence consists of Acts of Parliament, constitutional statutes, judicial decisions 
in form of case law, constitutional conventions as well as general principles of law.243 An 
explicit right to good administration or a right to be heard in administrative procedure does 
not expressly result from the constitutional sources of law. Notably, the lack of one of 
those rights in the classic historic sources of law like the Bill of Rights 1689 or the Human 
Rights Act 1998 shows the lack of a historic concept of good administration.  
However, the procedural rights enforced by judicial review match the concept of natural 
justice which has been described as providing a kind of code of fair administrative 
procedure.244 
The minimum standards of procedural fairness and therefore natural justice are two general 
principles: The right to a fair hearing, audi alteram partem, and the rule against bias, nemo 
judex in causa sua.245 The right to be heard is recognised as to be central to the concept of 
natural justice.246 The most characteristic matter of the British administrative law system is 
the absence of a formal separation between private law and public law.247 Natural justice is 
not to be understood as a specific procedural rule, but as a general principle of fairness, 
which does not only apply to administrative procedure, but also to all areas of British law. 
Hence, its standing as general principle leads is comparable to the French droits de la 
défense . 
According to the early and leading precedent Cooper Wandsworth Board of Works the 
principle of audi alteram partem says: 
“(…) although there are no positive words in a statute requiring that the party 
shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the 
legislature.“ 248 
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British law and along with it the British administrative law shows decisive structural 
differences to the German law as well as the Roman and civil law systems due to its case 
law orientated common law system. British administrative law developed remarkably late 
in opposite to continental administrative law systems.249 The famous quote of A. V. Dicey 
1885 says 
‘In England, (…) the system of administrative law and the very principles on which 
it rests are in truth unknown (…)’.250 
Even in 1964, Lord Reid stated in the Ridge v Baldwin case that 
‘We do not have a developed system of administrative law – perhaps until fairly 
recently we did not need it.’251 
Afterwards, beginning in the 1960s, the development of administrative law principles by 
case law increased. Administrative law first occurred as the judicial review of 
administrative action,252 which until today is generally exercised not by a special 
administrative judiciary but by the ordinary courts253 even if the ‘Administrative Court’ 
became established as a specialist court of the High Court of Justice in 2000.  
Statutory requirements of administrative procedure are quite sparse.254 However, few 
specified rules apply, for example the Tribunals and Inquiries Act of 1992. The Council on 
Tribunals issued a set of model rules on general procedural guidelines which provide that 
the Tribunal shall conduct the hearing in such manner that it considers it most suited to the 
clarification of the issues before it.255 In 2007, the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 
came into force, which provided significant changes to the courts and legal procedures. 
Purpose of this Act is the unification of the British Tribunal system, which takes the next 
step to an independent administrative law. 
However, due to the general absence of codified procedural rules, imposed by statute, the 
rules of natural justice as a general principle of law apply to British administrative 
procedure.  
The principle of natural justice nevertheless provides minimum requirements for the 
parties to ensure a fair decision and leads to an administration’s duty to act fairly.256 In 
general it may be said that the rules apply to the exercise of a decision-making power by a 
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public body where this may have detrimental consequences for the person affected.257 
Natural justice as a procedural requirement constitutes a characteristic of the adversary 
system, where the hearing is an instrument for determination of the circumstances. A 
hearing thus is not necessary whether other measures to determinate the circumstances are 
given, for example in those cases, where the inquisitorial system applies. However, as a 
general rule the adversary system applies in court proceedings.  
Until the judgement in the leading Ridge v. Baldwin case,258 the application of the rules of 
natural justice still required that the decision-making body must be under a duty to act 
judicially.259 Thus, an application to pure administrative procedures was not possible.260 
However, this case expanded the strict limitation of this principle.261 The rules of natural 
justice furthermore became applicable to not only ‘judicial’ proceedings, but also to ‘quasi-
judicial’ as well as to purely ‘administrative’ ones.262 The requirements of the audi alteram 
partem rule thus became conferred by case law to administrative procedure. 
The extent and substance of the requirements of the audi alteram partem guarantee are not 
strictly fixed, but depend on the particular case.263 Basically, the principle may include 
‘notice’ and ‘hearing’,264 namely the right to be given notification of the procedure and the 
right to make representations and be given an opportunity to respond to possible evidences 
whether in writing or orally.265 
Restrictions may apply to the right to notice where the public interest it requires.266 
Furthermore, an oral hearing is not required in all circumstances. However, where an oral 
hearing is held, the right includes the right to comment on any evidence presented and 
under circumstances the right to put questions to witnesses in a cross-examination.267 
The consequences of a breach of the principles of natural justice are not always precise. It 
is controversial, if decisions which are based on an infringement of natural justice are void 
or only voidable.268 In the outcome a breach will mostly lead to nullity of the decision.269 
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Practically, it is the court which decides whether the measure adopted is appropriate and 
the decision may be upheld. This may be the case whereas the validity of the act is only of 
indirect relevance, whereas in cases where the infringement has a direct effect to the 
measure adopted, it will seek the nullity of the act as a result.270  
Finally, the principle auf audi alteram partem contains a wider range of rules than the 
principle of a hearing in German law. It not only guarantees the actual substantive 
procedural right to be informed of the procedure and to be able to express an opinion, but 
also the access to the file, the right to legal representation and the right to be given 
reason271 which has to be distinguished from the right to be heard as well in German as in 
European law. 
 
5.1.3. Germany 
Neither the German constitution nor the German administrative law know a right to good 
administration comparable to the one guaranteed in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
However, the elementary components of the right to good administration are covered by 
the principle rule of law, the ‘Rechtsstaatsprinzip’, which is stipulated in Article 20 (3) 
GG. Even the German Federal Constitutional Court, the ‘Bundesverfassungsgericht’, 
recognised the right to fair conduct in administrative proceedings, which shall be an 
elementary part of the rule of law.272 Thus, the general right to due process and the right to 
be heard in particular already has been recognised as a general principle of German law 
even before it was codified,273 merely the details have been partly controversial.274  
The right to be heard in administrative procedure is not already the result of Article 103 
(1) GG, which guarantees the right to be heard only in court proceedings.275 Due to its 
systematic position as well as the clear wording ‘in the court’, Article 103 (1) GG refers 
only to the right to be heard before the court and not before any administrative body.276  
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The guarantee of the right to be heard can be put down to several linking points in the 
German Constitution. One the one hand, the right to be heard is seen as a required result of 
the rule of law.277 Therefore, the principle of legality of public administration, as stated in 
Article 20 (3) GG, demands fixed rules in administrative procedure. These secure rights of 
individuals, which the right to be heard is part of.278 
Furthermore, due process as part of the rule of law applies as well in administrative 
procedure, thus the rights of defence also have to be guaranteed in administrative 
procedure.279 
Additionally, the right to be heard can be understood as the respect of human dignity in 
accordance with Article 1 (1) GG. Also outside court proceedings, every person must not 
be made an object of government or state action.280 Human dignity demands that the 
person concerned has to be given rights of defence so that he can evade being made into an 
object of government action by exerting influence on the procedure. 
The German jurisdiction consequently derives the right to be heard in administrative 
procedure in a synopsis of the principle of human dignity and due process as part of the 
rule of law.281 Furthermore, the right to be heard serves as the protection of fundamental 
rights.282 Eventually, even the principle of democracy demands a participation of the 
citizens in state actions. Therefore, administrative decisions might be legitimated by 
participation of the person concerned.283 
As seen, the right to be heard is established in the German Constitution, even if it is not 
explicitly codified. Clear definitions of this right can be found in the laws on 
administrative procedure, ‘Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetze’ of both ‘Bund’ and ‘Länder’, 
namely in § 28 VwVfG, § 66 VwVfG for formal procedures and § 73 VwVfG for the plan 
approval procedure. What is more, almost identical rules concerning the hearing of parties 
can be found in the corresponding laws § 24 SGB X, the Social Code and § 91 AO of the 
taxation regulations.  
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According to § 28 (1) VwVfG, a hearing must be given before an administrative act, which 
interferes with the rights of the party involved, may be adopted. The person concerned 
must be given the opportunity of expressing his opinion on the facts relevant to the 
decision. According to the jurisdiction and part of the doctrine, this right only applies to 
unfavourable administrative acts, which does not include the refusal of a requested 
benefit.284 
According to § 28 (1) VwVfG the hearing takes place on the facts relevant to the decision. 
This has raised the question whether the hearing only covers the actual facts of the 
circumstances,285 or applies to questions of law as well.286 Here the latter is clearly to 
recommend as questions of law are necessary to understand the actual circumstances. A 
special kind of form is not mandatory, so that a hearing can take place in a written or oral 
form or can even take place electronically.287 
There are a couple of exceptions to the duty of a hearing stated in § 28 (2) VwVfG when it 
is not required by the circumstances of the individual case. Those could be the necessity of 
an immediate decision when there is danger ahead or a hearing would endanger the aims of 
the decision. According to § 28 (3) VwVfG a hearing shall be precluded when it would 
interfere with a compelling public interest. 
The German law on administrative procedure follows the concept of a ‘serving-function’ 
of procedural rights to ensure the enforcement and protection of substantive law.288 Basic 
idea of this principle is that procedural regulations are only relevant to the protection of 
subjective rights when there are specific effects to fundamental rights.289 This is shown in 
the composition of §§ 45, 46 VwVfG, which regulates the suspension or annulment of 
incorrect issued administrative acts in a very restrictive way.290 Also the fact that the right 
to be heard of § 28 VwVfG according to the jurisdiction and part of the prevailing doctrine 
                                                 
284 BVerwGE 66, 184 at p. 186; BVerwGE 68, 267 at p. 270; this point is discussed very controversial in 
German literature, H. Bonk & D. Kallerhoff, in P. Stelkens et al. (eds.), Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz 7th edn. 
(München, 2008), § 28, para 28; dissenting most part of the prevailing doctrine J. Feuchthofen, ‚Der 
Verfassungsgrundsatz des rechtlichen Gehörs und seine Ausgestaltung im Verwaltungsverfahren’ (1984) 
DVBl., 170 at p. 174; F. Kopp & U. Ramsauer, Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz 11th edn. (München, 2010), 
§ 28, Rn. 26a with further references. 
285 F. Schoch, ‚Das rechtliche Gehör Beteiligter im Verwaltungsverfahren’ (2006) Jura 2006, 833 at p. 836; 
C. Ule & H. Laubinger, Verwaltungsverfahrensrecht 4th edn. (Köln, 1995), § 24, para 4.  
286 Thus the prevailing doctrine K. Schwarz, in M. Fehling & B. Kastner (eds), Verwaltungsrecht, 2nd ed. 
(Baden-Baden, 2010), § 28, para 26; H. Pünder, in H. Erichsen & E. Ehlers (eds.), Allgemeines 
Verwaltungsrecht 14th edn. (Berlin, 2010), § 14, para 29; H. Maurer, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht 17th edn. 
(München, 2009), § 19, para 20.  
287 K. Ritgen, in H. Knack & H. Henneke (eds.), Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz 9th edn (Köln, 2010), § 28, 
para 21. 
288 BVerfGE 105, 48 at p. 60. 
289 F. Kopp & U. Ramsauer, Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz 11th edn. (München, 2010), § 28, Rn. 4. 
290 M. Sachs, in P. Stelkens et al. (eds.), Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz 7th edn. (München, 2008), § 45, 
para 10. 
 59
does only apply to unfavourable administrative acts, reflects the German concept of the 
‘serving-function’ of procedural rights in administrative procedure.  
 
5.1.4. Consensus of the Member States’ regulations and the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights 
The requirements, the extent as well as the content of the right to be heard display a 
common European standard, which in so far corresponds to the one guaranteed by the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. Indeed, differences occur for example regarding the rules 
concerning the effects of the breach of fundamental rights. It can be assumed, however, 
that these differences may diminish due to the Europeanisation of the national regulations 
on administrative procedure at least in cross-border context. The right to be heard in 
administrative procedure therefore arises out of the general principles of Union’s law as 
they result from the constitutional traditions and their concretisations in ordinary law 
common to the Member States.  
The question is whether the regulations in the Member States can provide specific 
guidelines for a standardised right to be heard on European level and to what extent this 
corresponds to the scope of protection guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental rights. It 
is to say, that only the provisions of Germany and the United Kingdom have been 
examined here. A general proposition on what is the common Member States’ principle of 
the right to be heard can therefore not be stated. Regulations in other Member States like 
France, Spain or Italy are quite comparable in their basic understanding of granting a right 
to be heard in an administrative procedure.291 A common standard of all Member States’ 
provisions is that the addressee of a decision taken by an administrative body must be 
given the opportunity of expressing his opinion on the facts relevant to the decision. An 
express duty to hear third parties however is not stipulated in the Member States 
regulations. The analysis of Article 41 (2) CFR showed that such a duty is not part of this 
provision as well. Third parties thus can rely on Article 41 (2) CFR, even without being the 
addressee of the decision in that extent as the individual measure would affect them 
adversely. Furthermore, the Member States provisions stipulate that a hearing has to be 
held only before taking specific measures or decisions like adopting an administrative act. 
The crucial point is, however, that the guarantee expressly is not unspecific regarding the 
form of measure or decision which shall be adopted, but has only to be granted before 
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taking certain and specific forms of measures or decisions. Here lies a clear difference to 
Article 41 (2) CFR which does not require a specific measure but ‘any individual 
measure’. The content and the scope of the guarantee in the Member States do not differ 
from the one guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental rights. The party concerned has to 
be given the opportunity to express his opinion on the legal and actual facts before any 
individual measure which could affect him adversely is taken. 
The problem concerning the question if the right to be heard applies also to administrative 
acts, which includes the refusal of a requested benefit, is disputed in the administrative law 
of the Member States. Also, the wording of Article 41 (2) CFR is not clear in this case. 
However, this provision is concretised by the Code of Good Administrative Behaviour. 
This Code is indeed not legally binding, thus it is a source of interpretation and may help 
defining the content and scope of protection of Art. 41 (2) CFR. Article 16 of the Code 
demands that the official shall ensure that in any cases where the rights or interests of 
individuals are involved, the rights of defence are respected at every stage in the decision 
making procedure. Therefore, the right to be heard is not limited to measures, which 
constitutes infringement of rights and therefore unfavourable measures, but as well applies 
to measures which constitute the refusal of a requested benefit. 
 
5.2. The right to be heard in other international human rights 
agreements 
5.2.1. The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights from 1966 is one of the 
international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have 
collaborated or of which they are signatories and thus can supply guidelines which should 
be followed within the framework of Union law.292 The Covenant, which constitutes one of 
the most fundamental human rights agreements can therefore also function as a source of 
interpretation of rights for the general principles of Union law. Even the ECJ referred to 
the procedural rights of Article 14 ICCPR.293 
Article 14 ICCPR ensures a right to justice and fair trial, which is very similar to Article 6 
ECHR. Even its structure equals Article 6 ECHR as the first two paragraphs of both 
provisions contain related and partly identical statements. What is more, Article 14 (1) 
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ICCPR also contains general procedural rules for criminal or civil proceedings. Basic 
elements of the right to a fair and public hearing according to Article 14 ICCPR are – 
likewise to Article 6 ECHR – to be present in criminal cases and the opportunity to make 
representations as well as the latter in civil proceeding under the aspect of equal terms.294 
The provision of Article 14 (1) ICCPR also corresponds with regard to contents as well as 
the scope of protection to Article 6 ECHR. This leads to the fact, that for the interpretation 
of this provision not only the jurisdiction of the UN Human Rights Commission may be 
consulted.295 Also the jurisdiction of the institutions of the ECHR subserves as source of 
interpretation.296 
Concerning the scope of application of Article 14 ICCPR with respect to administration 
and administrative procedure, reference is made to the explanation regarding Article 6 
ECHR. Concerning the civil rights and obligations, in certain constellations public 
contestations might be covered when rights of citizens are involved. In fact, administrative 
procedures might be involved in selective cases.297 This does not lead to a general 
application to administrative procedure.298 Regarding the area of criminal charge, the 
criteria developed by the ECHR may be consulted, so it might apply to certain specific 
cases in administrative procedure.  
The indication which can be awarded for Article 6 ECHR concerning administrative 
procedure cannot be denied to Article 14 ICCPR due to its comparability. However, due to 
the huge significance of the ECHR to Union law, not only as source of law for the general 
principles but also regarding the future accession of the Union to the ECHR, the indication 
effect of Article 14 ICCPR for the general principles eventually lacks of practical 
relevance, since its scope of protection is already fully covered by Article 6 ECHR. 
 
5.2.2. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 as a declaration adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly does not constitute legally binding international law. 
Most parts do constitute ius cogens and international customary law.299 This declaration 
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contains a provision of judicial rights in Article 10 UDHR which says that ‘everyone is 
entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial 
tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge 
against him’. This guarantee served as a role model for the creation of Article 6 ECHR and 
accordingly contains similarities to Article 14 ICCPR as well. Despite its lack of a hint to 
civil rights, the term of rights and obligations is to be understood identical to the provision 
in Article 6 ECHR.300 In addition, exceeding procedural rights, notably concerning 
administrative procedure, cannot be derived from the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. 
 
5.3. The right to be heard in soft law 
5.3.1. Soft law – a not binding source of law 
Besides the already examined Union’s sources of law and sources of interpretation of 
rights, the EJC additionally takes into account the Union’s soft law of its jurisdiction and 
considers it as a source of interpretation of rights like the Declaration on Democracy and 
the Declaration on the Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. 
A generally accepted definition of soft law does not exist. This terminology is meant to 
indicate that the instrument or provision in question is not itself a ‘law’. However, it is 
required to pay particular attention to its importance within the general framework of 
international legal development. Soft law is not ‘law’, it constitutes non-binding 
instruments or documents or non-binding provisions in treaties.301 
In European Union law the term soft law applies to certain measures, which are not binding 
to its addressees such as guidelines, recommendations, declarations, opinions and codes of 
conduct. To those measures belong the following regulations on administrative procedure 
of the Council of Europe as well as OECD documents. What is more, the above mentioned 
Code of Good Administrative Behaviour, which concretises the right to be heard as stated 
in Article 41 CFR, is also part of the Union’s soft law.  
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5.3.2. Resolutions and recommendations of the Council of 
Europe 
Furthermore, the non-binding provisions of the Council of Europe, for example the ‘Joint 
Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission concerning the 
protection of Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ of 1977 as well as 
numerous resolutions and recommendations concerning administrative procedure also 
belong to the Union’s soft law provisions. 
Those regulations constitute recommendations in the sense of Article 15 (b) of the Statute 
of the Council of Europe. 
To create a common minimum standard of reference, the Committee of Ministers adopted 
the Resolution of 28 September 1977, No. R 77 (31) of the Council of Europe ‘On the 
Protection of the Individuals in Relation to the Acts of Administrative Authorities’. In the 
recital, reference has been made to the fact that, in spite of the differences between the 
administrative and legal systems of the Member States, there was a broad consensus 
concerning the fundamental principles which should guide the administrative procedures 
and particularly the necessity to ensure fairness in the relations between the individual and 
administrative authorities. Although this legal text does not use the words of good 
administration, it is the first legal document dealing explicitly with its underlying 
principles.302 This resolution sets out five fundamental principles: The right to be heard, 
the right of access to information, the right of assistance and representation and the 
obligation to state reasons for decisions and finally the obligation to state available 
remedies against an administrative act. A legal definition for the term ‘administrative act’ 
can be found in the Recommendation of 11 March 1980 No. R (80) 2 ‘Concerning the 
Exercise of Discretionary Powers by Administrative Authorities’. According to this 
recommendation, the term ‘administrative act’ means, in accordance with the above 
mentioned Resolution No. R (77) 31, any individual measure or decision which is taken in 
the exercise of public authority and which is of such nature as directly to affect the rights, 
liberties or interests of persons whether physical or legal. 
The Resolution No. R 77 (31) provides the right to be heard as its first guarantee. 
According to this provision, the person concerned may put forward facts and arguments 
and, in appropriate cases, call evidence. This will be taken in to account by the 
administrative authority in respect of any administrative act of such nature as is likely to 
affect adversely his rights, liberties or interests. In appropriate cases the person concerned 
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is informed of these rights in due time and in a manner appropriate to the case, . The legal 
text is followed by an explanatory memorandum, which includes general considerations as 
well as comments in the annex. According to the explanatory memorandum the underlying 
idea of the resolution is to achieve a high degree of fairness in the relations between the 
administration and the individual. Thus, the right to be heard provides that the person 
concerned is given an opportunity to be heard during the administrative procedure: He may 
put forward facts and arguments and call evidence, where appropriate.  
Further fundamental recommendations to create a common minimum standard of reference 
in European administrative procedure are the Recommendation of 11 March 1980 No. 
R (80) 2 ‘Concerning the Exercise of Discretionary Powers by Administrative Authorities’ 
and the Recommendation of 25 November 1981 No. R (81) 19 of the Committee of 
Minister to Member States ‘on the Access to Information Held by Public Authorities’. 
According to its comments in the appendix, the Recommendation No. R (80) 2 draws the 
obligations placed on administrative authorities when they are exercising discretionary 
powers. Their purpose is to ensure that the latitude conferred by legislation is exercised in 
a just and fair manner and not abused or used in an arbitrary way. The preamble recalls the 
general principles governing the protection of the individual in relation to the acts of 
administrative authorities as set out in Resolution No. R (77) 31. Thus, the right to be 
heard of Resolution No. R (77) 31 applies in proceedings when using discretionary powers 
as well. 
Another contribution to the creation of a common minimum standard of administrative 
procedure constitutes the Recommendation of 19 September 1987 No. R (87) 16 of the 
Committee of Ministers to Member States ‘on Administrative Procedures affecting a large 
Number of Persons’. It is the aim of this recommendation to provide a fair and effective 
protection in administrative procedure also for a large number of persons. For this purpose, 
the recommendation has pointed to the general principles laid down in Resolution No. 
R (77) 31 as well as to the relevant principles included in Recommendation No. R (80) 2. 
By this means, the principle of the right to be heard also applies to administrative 
procedures affecting a large number of persons. 
All of these resolutions and recommendations do not directly bind the Member States of 
the Council of Europe. However, they do document the common opinion of the Member 
States concerning what is necessary for the protection of their citizens and concerning 
fairness in administrative procedure. Those non legally binding resolutions and 
recommendations being soft law serve as a source of interpretation of rights and therefore 
can by consulted by the ECJ when establishing general principles. Advocate General 
Warner referred to the right to be heard in administrative procedure as laid down in 
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Resolution Nr. R (77) 31 and how to reconcile it with the need for efficient 
administration.303 
 
5.3.3. OECD documents 
By including the right to good administration in the Charter of Fundamental Rights in 
2002, its principles became part of an international declaration of human rights for the first 
time. Its underlying principle of ‘good governance’ had already been an essential part of 
regulations of the Council of Europe as well as of the Organisation of Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD). 
According to Article 1 of the Convention of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development,304 the aims of the Organisation shall be to promote policies designed to 
achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising standard of 
living in Member countries, while maintaining financial stability, and thus to contribute to 
the development of the world economy. The OECD’s mandate also covers questions of 
public governance.  
The 1987’s report Administration as Service, the Public as a Client305 already dealt with 
the relationship between administration and the public at an early stage. It poses the 
question why relations between the public and the public service were problematic and 
considers possible approaches to making things better. The approach was pragmatic; the 
report intended to stimulate ideas for improvement in practice and was addressed to 
practitioners in public service.306 
Special attention should be paid to the Recommendation on Improving Ethical Conduct in 
the Public Service, adopted by the OECD Council on 23 April 1998.307 The 
Recommendation is based on a set of twelve principles for managing ethics in the public 
service agreed to in the public management committee to help Member countries to review 
their ethic management systems. They intend to establish ethical standards for public 
service which should be clear and reflected in the legal framework and also demand that 
the decision-making process should be transparent. 
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Those principles became acknowledged by the European Ombudsman, who recommended 
on basis of this and other recommendations his proposal for a Code of Good 
Administrative Behaviour in which the citizen’s rights against the administration became 
concretised on basis of these ethical guidelines. The European Ombudsman refers 
explicitly to this recommendation in his special report concerning the own-initiative 
inquiry about the proposal for the Code.308 
OECD’s documents thus influence as soft law the development of Union’s administrative 
procedural rules. In form of reports and recommendations the OECD had a decisive impact 
on the development of the public’s administration ethical conduct against citizens. These 
became as source of interpretation of rights part of the general principles and finally part of 
written primary law in terms of Article 41 CFR.  
 
6. Conclusion – the right to be heard as part of European 
Administrative Procedure 
The right to be heard is one of the most important procedural rights in European 
administrative procedure. This thesis demonstrated the standards and demands which the 
sources of Article 6 TEU provide for a fair hearing. 
The examination has shown why Article 6 TEU can be described as an ‘Article of 
recognition of human rights’ and how the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the general principles ensure a ‘triple protection’ of 
human rights under the Treaty of Lisbon and the similarities and differences of the 
different sources regarding the right to be heard. 
The right to be heard as part of the right to good administration of Article 41 CFR can be 
traced back to the general principle of a good and sound administration as well as to the 
‘droits de la défence’, developed by the ECJ. For the person concerned, the right to be 
heard is the most important right in administrative procedure. It serves as a protection of 
fundamental rights as well as a clarification of the facts and thus leads to the ‘right’ 
decision of the authorities. The right to be heard has to be granted on every level of 
administrative procedure and includes apart from the right to information mainly the right 
to give statements. The personal scope of application includes natural and legal persons 
and also the Member States in a restricted sense. They have the right to be heard regarding 
                                                 
308 Special Report from the European Ombudsman to the European Parliament following the own-initiative 
inquiry into the existence and the public accessibility, in the different Community institutions and bodies, of 
a Code of Good Administrative Behaviour (OI/1/98/OV), D. Conclusions and Recommendation, Fn. 9, 
available at http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/specialreport.faces/en/407/html.bookmark (date 
viewed April 5th 2012). 
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‘his or her affairs’. This not only does apply to the addressees of a measure but requires a 
‘special link’ between the person concerned and the measure to take. The right to be heard 
can be exercised vis-à-vis to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union as 
well vis-à-vis to the Member States in so far as they indirectly implement Union law by 
acting directly on the basis of Union law. In the area of indirectly implementing Union law 
by acting on the basis of national rules the obligation results from the general principles. 
The right to be heard might be limited or dropped under certain circumstances. In 
European administrative procedure a cure of procedural errors is only possible during the 
administrative proceeding and not in the court proceedings. Article 16 of the Code of Good 
Administrative Behaviour concretises the right to be heard in Article 41 CFR. 
Even before the Union’s accession to the ECHR, its rights are of high relevance in the 
course of the general principles. The applicability of Article 6 (1) ECHR in administrative 
procedure is still contested. However, the thesis demonstrated, that Article 6 ECHR is 
applicable in certain specific administrative procedure and has to be conceded an 
indication effect for administrative procedure in general. 
Moreover, the right to be heard is part of the general principles of Union law. In this 
respect, its importance is comparable to the right to be heard of Article 41 CFR or the ones 
in secondary law. Furthermore, the right to be heard can be derived from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States. In this respect, the ECJ does not only refer to the 
constitutions themselves but also to national administrative law. International human rights 
agreements, as well as soft law provisions like resolutions of the Council of Europe, 
provide rights to be heard.  
The right to be heard is explicitly guaranteed by regulations in several areas of secondary 
law. Even though it was not the aim of this thesis to examine these provisions in detail, the 
areas where the right to be heard has the most important effect and impact are going to be 
pointed out briefly: One of the most important areas of application is the field of 
competition law. It has been explicitly provided by secondary legislation since the early 
days of competition policy.309 In the area of anti-trust law, the right to be heard can be 
found in Article 27 regulation No 1/2003.310 Chapter V of the implementing regulation 
points out the exercise of the right to be heard of in detail.311 Further rules occur from the 
                                                 
309 H. P. Nehl, Principles of administrative procedure in EC law (Oxford, 1999), 71; J. Joshua, ‘The right to 
be heard in EEC competition procedures’ (1991-1992) 15 FILJ 16 at p. 16 et seqq.; C. Kerse, ‘Procedures in 
EC Competition Cases: The Oral Hearing’ (1994) ECLR 40 at p. 40 et seqq. 
310 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ [2003] L 1/1. 
311 Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the 
Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, OJ [2004] L 123/18. 
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decision on the terms of hearing officers,312 which as well are applicable to the area of 
merger control. The right to be heard concerning merger control can be found in Article 18 
regulation No 139/2004.313 Another important area of application is the anti-dumping law. 
It took the ECJ until 1991 to acknowledge that the right to be heard was also applicable to 
anti-dumping proceedings314. Today the right to be heard in anti-dumping proceedings is 
explicitly granted by Article 5 (10) and Article 6 (4) regulation No 1225/2009.315 
Further areas are those of Customs Law and the administration of the European Social 
Fund. State aid procedures are special: For example the rights to be heard are granted in 
primary law in Article 108 (2) TFEU for the main examination procedures.316  
This wide branch of application underlines the importance of the right to be heard in every 
area and on every level of administrative procedure. What is more, the thesis has shown 
that it has to be granted even if secondary legislation does not provide any written 
provision. 
Looking into the future, a common law of European administrative procedure would be 
desirable to ensure a consistent standard of procedural rights on the European level. 
Whereas the Code of Good Administration is a first step to a codification of procedural 
rules in direct administration, a similar unification in the area of indirect implementation of 
Union law seems to be even harder to achieve. Due to the procedural autonomy of the 
Member States, a harmonisation of procedural standards cannot be ordered by the 
European Union. Different approaches of implementing Union law in the different 
Member States leads de facto to a fragmentation of technically harmonised Union law. In 
this respect, a voluntary approximation of law should be promoted and supported from the 
Member States and the Union. Regarding the right to be heard, all Member States 
guarantee this right in general, whereas the specific forms of granting still differ. This 
thesis pointed out that it mainly affects functions of administrative procedure in general as 
well as the requirements of the forms of action or effects of procedural errors. Ultimately, 
the pursued objective should be to treat comparable situations in European or national 
administrative procedure equally regardless of a cross-border element.  
                                                 
312 Commission Decision of 23 May 2001 on the terms of reference of hearing officers in certain competition 
proceedings, OJ [2001] L 162/21. 
313Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), OJ [2004] L 24/1. 
314 Case C-49/88 Al-Jubail Fertilizer [1991] ECR I-3187. 
315 Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from 
countries not members of the European Community, OJ [2009] L 343/51. 
316 The rights of complainants in the preliminary investigation are debatable due to a lack of a procedural 
guarantee in secondary legislation. 
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